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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past two decades a growing attention towards the phenomenon of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has emerged and firms are increasingly expected to 
implement CSR practices by socially conscious stakeholders. The purpose of this thesis 
is to study the relationship between CSR performance and cost of debt of a firm in order 
to find out how non-financial performance and CSR practices are considered by creditors 
when assessing the creditworthiness of a firm.   
 
In this thesis CSR performance is measured with environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) scores. The impact of ESG scores on the firms’ cost of debt is examined using 
pooled OLS regressions. The data includes information on 346 publicly listed firms from 
7 European markets and it is obtained from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database for the 
time period from 2002 to 2018. Furthermore, the thesis aims to find out whether the firms 
with the highest ESG scores gain financial benefit in the form of a lower cost of debt 
contrasted with the firms with the lowest ESG scores.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature by finding empirical evidence supporting 
the theory that firms with superior CSR performance tend to benefit from lower interest 
rates in the European market. The findings suggest that firms with superior overall ESG 
scores are rewarded by creditors with lower interest rates. Furthermore, the results 
propose that firms wanting to decrease their cost of debt should invest especially in CSR 
activities that improve the social score of the firm as superior social performance can lead 
to equally lower cost of debt as having a high overall ESG score. In addition, high 
governance scores, and contradictorily also low social scores, are found to be negatively 
related to cost of debt but the impact is smaller compared to the high overall ESG scores 
and the high social scores. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS: CSR, ESG, cost of debt   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Sustainability and corporate social responsibility have become some of the most 
significant trends in decades affecting the financial markets (Clark, Feiner & Viehs 2015; 
Ng & Rezaee 2015; Kim & Venkatachalam 2011). The number of companies reporting 
on sustainability issues has been increasing substantially. In 2017 85% of the companies 
listed in S&P 500 index published sustainability or corporate responsibility reports, 
whereas in 2011 the number was below 20%. The increase in the numbers is largely due 
to investors becoming more aware of sustainability issues, which has lead to an increase 
in the demand for relevant, comparable and accurate disclosure of ESG (environmental, 
social and governance) reports from the companies that they hold in their portfolios. 
(G&A Institute 2018.) 
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of an investor there is a debate about whether applying 
the sustainability criteria has a positive or negative impact on creating value for the 
investment (Jensen 2002). At the same time there is also an ongoing debate of whether 
the cost of implementing more corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices exceeds 
the monetary benefit gained from such activities. To put more simply, is responsible and 
conscious behaviour financially beneficial. In this thesis, cost of debt is used as a proxy 
for financial performance. 
 
The latest United Nations Global Compact CEO study (Accenture 2016) examined the 
attitudes towards sustainability of more than one thousand CEOs globally. According to 
the results, 97% of the CEOs regarded sustainability as either an important or very 
important factor affecting the future success of their companies. Conversely, only 67% 
of the respondents thought that their company has taken adequate measures to tackle the 
global challenges related to sustainability. (Accenture 2016.)  
 
One explanation for why the incorporation of CSR practices is still perceived as partly 
challenging is that there is still a lot of focus on the short-term results on the financial 
markets. A survey conducted by McKinsey & Company and CPP Investment Board 
found that 79% of the respondents who are C-level executives and board members 
personally feel responsible for delivering financial results in less than 2 years. Moreover, 
the incentive structures of firms are often build to reward short-term performance, which 
conflicts with the sustainability goals that commonly require a long-term approach. 
Consequently, the focus on making long-term strategic decisions that would benefit the 
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company both with a stronger financial performance and increased innovation in the 
future is deteriorated. (Bailey, Bérubé, Godsall & Kehoe 2014; Eccles & Serafeim 2013.)  
 
Historically, the idea that there is an exiting correlation between corporate responsibility 
and the financial performance of a firm has not always received unanimous acceptance. 
Traditionally, activities related to corporate responsibility are regarded as a cost to the 
firm as it is considered that the resources used for such activities could be invested more 
profitably. Thus, according to the conventional view activities related to corporate 
responsibility ought to be avoided. (Magnanelli & Izzo 2017; Sharfman & Fernando 
2008.) 
 
However, there has been a shift in attitudes and sustainability is increasingly recognized 
for having the potential to increase profits as well as introduce options for improved value 
creation. Contrasted with the traditional view that the sole purpose of a business is to 
increase the value for its owners through efficiency and cost structures the shift in the 
attitudes is even more pronounced. (Humphrey, Lee & Shen 2012.) 
 
The inclusion of ESG factors into the firm’s sustainability strategy has the possibility to 
lead to cost savings through sustainable innovation in various fields affecting for example 
resource efficiency and product development. These improvements enable higher 
margins and revenues leading to enhanced financial performance. (Zeidan & Spitzek 
2015; Eccles et al. 2013; Sharfman et al. 2008.) Moreover, CSR activities can be 
considered when forming the risk management strategy for a firm. Various risks related 
to environmental, social and governance issues may compromise the reputation of the 
firm. Thus, CSR activities can be utilized to enhance the reputation and control the risk 
of receiving disadvantageous political, regulatory or social sanctions. The absence of 
CSR activities may result in the loss of either firm or executive reputation, increased 
political pressure or pressure from the media, monetary sanctions and a possibility of 
consumer boycott. Overall, the financial benefits gained from CSR activities are seen to 
have the potential to surpass the the costs related to the activities. (Al-Hadi, Chatterjee, 
Yaftian, Taylor & Hasan 2017; Minor & Morgan 2011; Godfrey 2005.)  
 
Previously, most studies have concentrated on the relationship between CSR performance 
and cost of equity (Cellier & Chollet 2016; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra 2011; 
Sharfman et al. 2008). This is perhaps due to the conventional perception of equity market 
pricing the CSR performance of firms more efficiently compared to the debt market. 
(Erragragui 2018.) However, research focusing on the relation between CSR performance 
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and cost of debt has emerged in the recent years. The importance of corporate debt market 
in current financial market is demonstrated by the estimations of corporate debt market 
exceeding $253 trillion in the end of 2019, whereas global equity outstanding represented 
$85 trillion according to Deutche Bank (Institute of International Finance 2020; CNBC 
2019). This indicates that debt is the most significant form of external financing for firms, 
which emphasizes the need to understand how CSR performance is evaluated among 
creditors. 
 
Goss and Roberts (2011) as well as Hsu and Chen (2015) use data from the United States 
to examine the relation between CSR performance and financial risk. The results of Goss 
et al. (2011) suggest that banks perceive CSR concerns as increased financial risk which 
is reflected in the cost of debt. Accordingly, firms with CSR concerns have a higher cost 
of debt compared to firms with superior CSR performance. Hsu et al. (2015) find that 
firms with superior CSR performance benefit from being responsible. Such firms are 
likely to have higher credit ratings and a lower cost of debt in comparison with firms that 
have low CSR performance scores. The results indicate that CSR related activities reduce 
the financial risk by improving the information asymmetry between the firm and its 
stakeholders. The results of the above-mentioned studies are supported by Erragragui 
(2018) who studies the relation between corporate social performance and the cost of debt 
of firms in the United States. He finds that concerns related to environment increase the 
cost of debt, whereas concerns related to governance have no effect on the default risk 
perceived by creditors. However, superior performance in either area is rewarded with a 
lower cost of debt.  
 
Contradictory evidence is presented by Sharfman et al. (2008) who demonstrated that 
increased environmental risk management is associated with a higher cost of debt capital 
using the data of S&P 500. These results are supported by the findings of Magnanelli and 
Izzo (2017) who similarly find a positive relationship between CSR performance and cost 
of debt. In other words, firms with strong CSR performance are associated with higher 
cost of debt. This supports the traditional view that suggests that creditors consider 
investments in CSR practices merely as redundant costs instead of factors having the 
potential to reduce risks. 
 
As described, the majority of previous studies focus on examining the effects of CSR 
performance on the cost of debt on the U.S. market. Thus, there is a lack of studies that 
would have been conducted using the data of companies listed in European stock 
exchanges. According to a Eurobarometer poll conducted by the European Commission 
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in 2017, 94% of European citizens consider conserving nature important and the 
percentage considering it very important has only increased over the last decade. The 
answers also describe the concern that the consumers have of products containing plastic 
and various chemicals and the possible negative consequences that these materials could 
have for the consumers’ own health as well as the environment. The poll further shows 
that the European consumers are personally devoted to act but expect the institutions and 
businesses to do the same. (European Commission 2017.) Thus, the increasing awareness 
concerning sustainability issues and the ongoing changes in consumption habits affect 
both financial institutions as well as firms, as consumers demand also them to react and 
adapt accordingly. This gives a strong motivation to study whether CSR performance has 
an impact on the loan decisions in the European debt market.  
 
This study concentrates on examining the European markets by analysing altogether 346 
firms from 7 European markets. The methodology of this study follows the methodology 
of Erragragui (2018) but differs from the previous literature by utilizing the data of 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4. This study contributes to the existing literature by finding 
evidence supporting the theory that firms with superior CSR performance tend to benefit 
from lower interest rates.  
 
 
1.1. Objectives of the thesis 
 
Corporate responsibility has been an increasingly popular subject of interest in financial 
research for the past decade. Previous research has mostly concentrated on using the data 
from the U.S. market. This thesis contributes to the literature by continuing the research 
and examining whether CSR performance, which in this study is measured with the ESG 
ratings, has an effect on the firms’ cost of debt capital in the European markets.  
 
The motivation behind studying the ESG ratings impact on the firms’ cost of debt capital 
is understanding the significance of the ESG ratings and CSR efforts to the creditors. The 
findings answering this question will also contribute to the debate of whether firms 
benefit financially from superior CSR performance. The extent to which firms benefit 
from having positive ESG ratings will also indicate to what degree ESG criteria should 
be implemented and resources allocated to firms with high ESG ratings and thus superior 
CSR performance. The subject of this thesis has also novelty value as the impact of ESG 
criteria on a firm’s cost of debt capital has not yet been largely studied and the findings 
seem to be divergent. 
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The research question is formulated to examine the possible financial benefit that having 
a superior CSR performance could result in. The theories of corporate social 
responsibility indicate that responsibility practices diminish the information asymmetry 
between the firm and its stakeholders decreasing the financial risk associated with the 
firm. Furthermore, the increased levels of transparency should lead to a better assessment 
of the risk profile of a firm. (Hsu et al. 2015.) The research question concentrates on 
finding out whether CSR performance has an impact on the cost of debt capital of a firm. 
The motivation is to find out how creditors consider non-financial performance when 
assessing the risk profile of a firm. The research question, more specifically, examines 
the following: 
 
How is the cost of debt of a firm affected by its ESG ratings? 
 
As described earlier, Hsu et al. (2015) and Goss et al. (2011) find that firms with low 
CSR performance have a higher cost of debt compared to firms with high CSR 
performance. Similarly, the results of Erragragui (2018) indicate that superior scores 
especially related to environmental and governance issues decreases the cost of debt. The 
following hypothesis is formulated based on the findings of previous research: 
 
High ESG ratings are inversely related to cost of debt. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis presents an extensive review of current research and theories on corporate 
social responsibility and the ESG ratings. This thesis will proceed in the following 
manner. The second chapter focuses on the theoretical background of corporate social 
responsibility introducing relevant theories behind CSR and the ESG criteria as well as 
socially responsible investing. The third chapter presents the debt market and theory 
behind the cost of debt of a firm. The fourth part reviews previous research regarding 
CSR affecting financial risk and cost of debt summarizing the main findings. The fifth 
chapter presents the data and thoroughly describes the research methods used in this 
thesis. The sixth chapter presents and analyses the empirical findings and discusses the 
limitations affecting the study. The last chapter summarizes the major findings and 
deductions of the research and finally concludes the thesis. Additionally, some topics for 
further research are suggested in the conclusions.   
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2. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to define corporate social responsibility and present the 
theoretical background by introducing the latest and most relevant theories behind 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) criteria, which has become the one of the most common ways of measuring the 
non-financial performance of a firm especially in matters related to CSR. Furthermore, 
the history behind the development of corporate social responsibility is introduced. This 
is important in order to understand the emergence of responsible investing.  
 
 
2.1. Defining CSR 
 
Corporate social responsibility is a much used term of a complex social phenomenon and 
thus it has been lacking a clear definition. The discussion related to CSR ranges from 
topics related to different aspects of ecology, society and economy such as profitability 
of business, stability of the economy, the organization of work and production to 
environmental preservation. In general, CSR is used to refer to actions related to 
employees, communities and the environment that are not required from the firm by the 
legislation. (Barnea & Rubin 2010.) In his study Sheehy (2015: 643) defines CSR as “a 
form of international private self-regulation focused on the reduction and mitigation of 
industrial harms and provision of public good”. 
 
European Commission (2011) defines corporate social responsibility (CSR) as “the 
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”. This definition is based on the 
presumption of firms respecting the legislation and the agreements with all its 
stakeholders. Operating in a socially responsible manner requires companies to integrate 
social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into its strategy and 
daily operations. The aim of a socially responsible firm is to maximise the value that it is 
creating not only for its shareholders but also for its other stakeholders as well as the 
whole society. Having a long-term CSR strategy that includes innovative product and 
service development as well as development of business models that have positive effects 
both socially and environmentally, supports this endeavour. Moreover, identifying, 
averting and diminishing possible unfavourable effects is an essential part of a CSR 
strategy. (European Commission 2011.) 
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2.2. Development of CSR 
 
The investors’ awareness about issues related to social responsibility has significantly 
increased in the past two decades as the research in corporate social responsibility and 
corporate governance has increased. The discussion around corporate social 
responsibility started already in the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S. as an outcome of rising 
civil-rights and feminist movements, the ongoing Vietnam War as well as a heightened 
concern of the state of the environment. The view that firms should take responsibility 
for these matters started gaining popularity among the general public. The history of 
socially responsible investing dates back to the same time, 1950s, when a fund called the 
Pioneer Fund first started screening sin stocks. The purpose was to assist Christian 
investors in shunning away from investing in industries promoting sin and vice. (De Colle 
& York 2009.)  
 
The view on what the main purpose of a company ought to be and to what extent it 
includes taking into consideration ethical issues has largely varied throughout the years. 
Previous research suggests two contrary views on CSR. The first one is the shareholder 
expense view, which takes a stand against CSR. Conversely, the second view is the theory 
of the stakeholder value maximization, which encourages CSR activities. (Li, Gong, 
Zhang & Koh 2018) 
 
In his famous essay Friedman (1970) states that the sole purpose of a business is to make 
profit. This view is known as the shareholder theory as according to the theory the firm 
is exclusively responsible for maximizing the returns for the shareholders. This implies 
that the firm has no responsibility for benefiting the other stakeholders or the society and 
therefore should not invest in CSR activities on behalf of its shareholders. Furthermore, 
he argues that if an individual shareholder wishes to contribute to a socially responsible 
cause he may do so at his own expense. This view was questioned by many already during 
the time when it was published. The opinions of the purpose of a business ranged from 
going beyond profit making and legal and economic requirements (Davis 1960; Backman 
1975; McGuire 1963) and voluntary activities (Manne & Wallich 1972) to taking 
responsibility in several social problem areas (Hay, Gray & Gates 1976) and giving way 
to social responsiveness (Ackerman & Bauer 1976; Sethi 1975). 
 
Despite the increased debate around the subject in the 1970s, corporate social 
responsibility still lacked a framework. A framework of CSR was constructed by Carroll 
(1979) based on the four different types of responsibilities that she distinguished in her 
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research. The four types identified are economic responsibility, legal responsibility, 
ethical responsibility and discretionary responsibility. The economic responsibility is the 
single most important responsibility of a business. It includes producing services and 
products needed in the society and selling them at a profit. Legal responsibility can be 
defined as the legislative environment and the common regulations and rules that 
companies are expected to follow in their operations. Their economic mission is supposed 
to be fulfilled within the limitations of the legislation. Ethical responsibilities mean the 
norms and encouraged behaviour defined by the society that companies ought to follow 
in their actions. Discretionary responsibilities mean all the additional social roles that are 
not defined by society but which society expects the company to assume. Such roles are 
voluntary and it is at the discretion of the company to choose the kind of social activities 
it wants to engage in. However, if a company would not wish to assume any such roles, 
it would not be considered as unethical by the society. (Carroll 1979.) 
 
In 1984 Freeman presented the stakeholder theory as an opposing theory to the 
shareholder theory that had been introduced over ten years earlier by Friedman (1970). 
Unlike the shareholder theory that argues that the most fundamental purpose of a firm is 
to maximize the profit of the owners of the firm, the stakeholder theory believes that firms 
should take into consideration also other stakeholders of the firm such as customers, 
employees and local communities. (Freeman 1984.)  
 
In the end of 20th century firms especially in the tobacco, oil and chemical industries 
started facing critique for their involvement in matters such as human rights violations 
and environmental disasters. As a consequence, they had to reassess their practices to 
gain back the trust of consumers and regulators. Similar expectations were soon aimed at 
firms in all the other industries that had so far been considered mostly uncontroversial. 
Some of the practices and policies were not completely new to the firms such as providing 
adequate and safe working conditions or healthcare to employees or donating to charity. 
However, the change initiated by adoption of CSR has made the firms’ reporting of CSR 
practices and their involvement in the society more coherent, comparable and 
professional. (Crane, Matten & Spence 2014.)  
 
Modern CSR frameworks that are used by firms and investors alike have also been 
influenced by the stakeholder theory of Friedman. One of the most notable frameworks 
is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which is the first global standards that is used by 
multinational corporations, small and medium enterprises as well as governments for 
sustainability reporting. The GRI standards were introduced in 2000 with the aspiration 
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of enabling third parties such as investors and creditors to evaluate and compare the 
responsibility in environmental, social and governance matters of firms and their supply 
chains. Furthermore, a framework for sustainability reporting increases the transparency 
of firms and helps firms in communicating their positive and negative sustainability 
impacts to stakeholders such as customers and creditors. The standards are used 
worldwide in 90 countries and in 2017 75% of the world’s largest 250 firms reporting on 
sustainability used GRI standards. (Global Reporting Initiative 2020.) 
 
The framework of corporate social responsibility is in constant change. For example, 
nowadays many of the companies operating in controversial businesses can without 
difficulty meet the responsibilities defined by Carroll (1979) yet many would not consider 
them socially responsible. The sin companies are regarded as unethical because of their 
core products, which often have unfavourable effects and consequences for an individual 
as well as the whole society. 
 
 
2.3. Evaluation of CSR performance 
 
The CSR performance of a firm can be evaluated according to ESG criterion that takes 
into account environmental, social and corporate governance issues (Renneboog, Horst 
& Zhang 2008). Table 1 presents some of the sustainability issues that are evaluated in 
each dimension of ESG criteria (Clark, Feiner & Viehs 2015).   
 
Table 1. Examples of sustainability issues included in the ESG criteria (Clark, Feiner & 
Viehs 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
• Biodiversity / land use 
• Carbon emissions 
• Climate change risks 
• Energy usage 
• Raw material sourcing 
• Regulatory risks 
• Supply chain 
management 
• Waste and recycling 
• Water management 
• Weather events 
Social 
• Community relations 
• Controversial business 
• Customer relations 
• Diversity issues 
• Employee relations 
• Health and safety 
• Human capital 
management 
• Human rights 
• Responsible 
marketing and R&D 
• Union relationships 
 
Governance 
• Accountability 
• Anti-takeover 
measures 
• Board structure and 
size 
• Bribery and 
corruption 
• CEO duality 
• Executive 
compensation 
schemes 
• Ownership structure 
• Shareholder rights 
• Transparency 
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Environmental score takes into account everything related to sustaining and preserving 
the environment. This includes factors such as emissions, waste management and the use 
of resources. The environmental score measures how the firm manages risks and 
opportunities related to environment and the impact it has on the nature. (Clark, Feiner & 
Viehs 2015.) 
 
Social score is used to evaluate the relation and trust between the firm and its stakeholders 
including the firms’ employees, customers, suppliers and the communities where it is 
active. Social score includes factors such as employee and customer relations, diversity, 
human rights and safety policies. (Clark, Feiner & Viehs 2015.) 
 
Governance score assesses the corporate governance of a firm and the firm’s processes 
that are meant to ensure that the board and management acts in a manner that benefits the 
shareholders and that mismanagement is minimized. The governance score includes 
factors such as the compensation of leadership, board structure, audits and internal 
controls as well as bribery and corruption practices. Furthermore, it indicates whether 
reporting is carried out according to legislation and common standards. (Clark, Feiner & 
Viehs 2015.) 
 
ESG criteria is increasingly utilized by firms’ socially conscious stakeholders such as 
investors and creditors to assess the sustainability performance of a firm. This, alongside 
financial information, is used to decide whether to invest in the stocks of the firm or to 
grant a loan. Besides the firms’ successes the investors are also interested in the risks 
emerging from the non-financial activities affecting the reputation of the firm that could 
be related to for example environmental disasters, violations in human rights, 
questionable working conditions or poor corporate governance. The ESG rating illustrates 
the measures and their impacts that the firm has undertaken related to improving its 
responsibility. Responsible practices lower the exposure to ESG risks and enhances the 
ESG ranking whereas the lack of responsible actions increases the risks resulting in a 
decreased ESG rating. (Crane et al. 2014.) 
 
The increasing interest towards measuring ESG is also reflected in the number of third-
party organizations that assess firms in order to provide ESG data. However, currently a 
standardized manner for measuring firms’ performance related to ESG issues does not 
exist. The challenge with developing a standard evaluation methodology arises from the 
complexity of depicting both the good performance as well as the deficiencies in a manner 
where the good results in one area do not hide the shortcomings in other areas. The 
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offsetting effect is not sought-after as firms are regarded socially responsible when the 
performance is in balance between different dimensions of ESG. (Escrig-Olmedo, 
Muños-Torres, Fernández-Izquierdo & Rivera-Lirio 2014.) 
 
 
2.4. Theories of CSR 
 
The value maximization theory, which is also known as the shareholder theory, states that 
all decisions made in a firm should be made with a regard to that they will increase the 
total market value of the firm in the long term. The total market value is considered to 
include equity, debt, preferred stock and warrants. The discussion around whether firms 
should maximize their value or not can be separated into two issues. The first one regards 
the value maximization of the firm as the single most important objective, whereas the 
second view questions the first view by stating that the objective of a firm should rather 
be something that benefits the society, for example sustaining employment or improving 
the environment. (Jensen 2002.) The value maximization theory takes a stand against 
CSR activities as they are seen to be a cost for the firm that could have been invested in 
something more profitable (Li et al. 2018). 
 
Stakeholder theory suggests that managers should take into account the interests of all 
stakeholders of the firm when making decisions. These stakeholders include both 
individuals as well as groups such as customers, employees, financial claimants, 
communities and government officials. (Jensen 2002.) The stakeholder theory is in favour 
of investments in CSR activities as they are seen to benefit the different stakeholders as 
well as the society at large (Li et al. 2018). 
 
When examining the contrasting interests of the firm’s management, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders, the theories of agency relationship and asymmetrical information need 
to be considered. Agency relationship is such where the principal (the owner) delegates 
some responsibilities to another person (the agent) allowing the agent control and right 
of decision. Thus, agency relationship can be defined as the separation of ownership from 
control. Practically, this means that stockholders give the management of the firm the 
responsibility for all decision making concerning the company while expecting the 
management to act in the stockholders’ best interest. However, managers do not always 
act in the best interest of the owners. Agency cost is the cost to the shareholder that arises 
as a consequence of such behaviour. (Jensen & Meckling 1976.)  
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Asymmetrical information is a consequence of the agency relationship. Asymmetrical 
information means that in financial transactions the other party has more relevant 
information than the other. In the context of this thesis it means that the manager has more 
relevant information about the company, its opportunities and risks compared to the 
creditor or investor. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 466.)  
 
There are varying views on whether CSR activities increase or decrease the value of the 
firm. Barnea and Rubin (2010) introduced the overinvestment theory, which is based on 
the agency theory of Jensen et al. (1976). In general, the overinvestment theory proposes 
that if CSR activities do not maximize the value of the firm, engaging in them is costly 
and a waste of resources that undermines the financial performance of the firm. Therefore, 
the overinvestment theory interprets high CSR performance negatively and suggests that 
the firms with the highest CSR scores are expected to have the highest cost of debt due 
to weak financial performance. (Jo & Harjoto 2012a; Barnea et al. 2010.) In their study 
Barnea et al. (2010) state that CSR expenses can be in line with maximizing the value of 
a firm if it is according to the preferences of the shareholders. According to their findings, 
to some extent investments in CSR activities contribute towards a higher firm value. 
However, CSR activities are often more advantageous to the managers than the 
shareholders, as managers bear little cost in investing in CSR activities but in doing so 
they personally benefit from gaining a reputation of promoting responsibility. This could 
lead to managers persuading firms to overinvest in CSR at the expense of the 
shareholders. CSR investments can thus be seen as agency conflicts between the 
management and the shareholders of the firm (Goss et al. 2011).  
 
Conflict resolution theory suggests the opposite. Van Beurden and Gössling (2008) 
conducted an extensive literature review on the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance. They find evidence of positive correlation between the two suggesting that 
implementing ethics in business is financially beneficial. The findings of Jo et al. (2012a) 
support this conclusion. Their results demonstrate that engagement in CSR activities, 
specifically those related to community, environment, diversity and employees, is 
positively related to financial performance. Furthermore, various studies (Lopatta, 
Buchholz & Kaspereit 2016; Hsu & Chen 2015; Kim & Kim 2014; Fombrun & Shanley 
1990) have studied the relation between CSR and agency costs and found that CSR 
activities diminish agency costs as they significantly reduce the information asymmetry 
that exists between the internal and external stakeholders. Thus, CSR is regarded to 
provide additional nonfinancial information for investors, creditors as well as regulators. 
This suggests, that the expenses of CSR activities can be rationalized as a way of reducing 
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the levels of asymmetrical information. Based on the conflict resolution theory high levels 
of CSR should reduce the cost of debt as more information of the firm is available for 
creditors.  
 
To summarize, the theories suggest that there is a balance that needs to be found between 
the possible financial benefits and disadvantages from CSR activities. The benefits 
include for example lower levels of information asymmetry between the firm and the 
investors. However, the firms need to be cautious of not overinvesting in CSR activities 
as this deteriorates the agency problem.  
 
 
2.5. Socially responsible investing 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) means identifying and investing in firms with high 
CSR. The CSR performance of a firm is generally assessed based on the ESG criteria. 
(Renneboog, Horst & Zhang 2008.) The development of socially responsible investing is 
largely enabled by the sustainability reporting standards such as the GRI. Screening for 
socially responsible investments would not be possible if information about the 
sustainability practices, policies and performance of firms would not be available. 
Furthermore, having common standards improves the quality of the reported information 
making it comparable. (Willis 2003.) 
 
Investors investing in a socially responsible manner expect not only to attain financial 
utility from their investments but also non-financial utility that comes with making 
investments that are in accordance with their personal and societal values (Bollen 2007). 
The results of previous research indicate that investors as well as analysts consider the 
improved performance in environmental risk factors when making investments and 
recommendations (Mackey, Mackey & Barney 2007; Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner 2001). 
 
In order to support and engage investors in taking ESG criteria into account alongside 
more traditional financial factors an international group consisting of world’s largest 
institutional investors created The Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) in 2006. 
The PRI presents six principles that suggest possible actions of how to include issues 
related to environmental, social and governance into investment practice. (UNPRI 2019.) 
In addition to principles guiding institutional investors in implementing ESG criteria, 
sustainability is also increasingly considered among financial institutes such as banks. 
United Nations Environment Programme - Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) runs a banking 
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programme which is a large network of over 130 leading banks all over the world. Their 
aim is to increase lending that supports economic activities that are both socially and 
environmentally sustainable. In order to support the endeavours towards reaching the 
sustainable development goals set by the Paris Climate Agreement the Principles of 
Responsible Banking were created by UNEP FI in 2019. The principles offer support for 
firms in aligning the strategy of the firm with the sustainability goals as well as setting 
objectives for the evaluation of the results. Furthermore, the public disclosure of the 
objectives, actions and results is recommended in order to increase transparency. (UNEP 
FI 2019.)  
 
The commitment of the 130 leading banks to follow the Principles of Responsible 
Banking implies that major financial institutes consider implementing sustainability 
criteria in all investment and loan decisions important and aim to prioritize investments 
that are sustainable for the environment and climate. This could be reflected in the 
findings of this research if banks favour high CSR performance with a lower cost of debt.  
 
2.5.1. Sin stocks 
 
Despite SRI gaining popularity among many investors in recent years, some investors do 
not abstain from investing also in so called sin stocks. Sin stocks are the stocks of publicly 
traded companies that are in the business of taking advantage of human weaknesses. The 
industries in which these companies operate include alcohol, tobacco, gambling, adult 
entertainment and weapons. (Blitz et al. 2017; Hong & Kacperczyk 2009.) In their 
research Hong et al. (2009) studied how the social norms affect the cost of capital of sin 
stocks. The products of these companies are often deemed sinful because of the addictions 
that they cause and the unfavourable consequences they have on an individual and the 
society if consumed excessively. Therefore, social norms do not encourage funding such 
businesses. (Hong et al. 2009.) 
 
Investing in these stocks is considered to be the opposite to responsible investing and 
highly against the Principles of Responsible Investment. Many investors form an 
exclusion list of stocks that they refuse to invest in in order to avoid being associated with 
the activities of these firms (Blitz et al. 2017; Kim & Venkatachalam 2011). According 
to the research of Hong et al. (2009) 15-20% of large institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and other norm-constrained institutions, avoid including sin stocks in their 
portfolios. Thus, they are willing to pay or accept missing a profit in order to discriminate 
certain stocks. This cost comes from a few different sources. Firstly, in avoiding sin 
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stocks one misses out on the opportunity of diversifying portfolio with such stocks. In 
addition to the aforementioned, sin stocks are found to often be comparably cheap when 
measured with price-to-book or price-to-earnings ratios and contrasted against other 
stocks with similar characteristics. This implies that sin stocks should have a higher cost 
of capital as a result of trading at a lower price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio. This avoidance of 
investing in sin stocks causes a considerable price effect as it affects the cost of capital of 
such firms significantly. (Hong et al. 2009.)  
 
Blitz et al. (2017) studied the observed anomaly of sin stocks generating positive 
abnormal returns. Previously, the abnormal returns have been rationalized as a result of 
the sin stocks being underpriced due to a large number of investors refusing to make 
investments in them. Therefore, investors who do invest in sin stocks would earn a 
premium from acting against the social norms (Hong et al. 2009). Another explanation 
for the sin stock premium is that the sin stock firms gain financial advantage from not 
acting according to the social norms as doing so would entail expenses related to 
maintaining a certain standard (Fabozzi, Ma & Oliphant 2008). However, the latest 
findings of Blitz et al. (2017) present contrasting evidence indicating that the sin stocks 
do not generate abnormal returns when controlled for profitability and investment asset 
pricing factors presented by Fama and French (2015) in addition to the size, value and 
momentum factors. Consequently, these findings contradict the theory of investors 
earning a premium due to the reputation risk when investing in sin stocks.   
 
In theory, sin stocks should have the weakest ESG performance as their attributes are 
contrary to those of good ESG performers. Sin stock firms abstain from conforming to 
socially acceptable standards, which can be expected to be reflected in the ESG scores of 
such firms. Under this assumption, sin stocks should be associated with a significantly 
higher risk profile and thus a higher cost of debt capital.  
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3. CORPORATE DEBT MARKET 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the global debt markets and its standing in the 
corporate capital markets. The most common forms of corporate debt; bank lending and 
corporate bonds, are presented and their characteristics and the factors affecting the cost 
of debt are described. The final part discusses how firms choose between different debt 
sources based on the findings of previous research.  
  
 
3.1. Structure of corporate debt market 
 
The capital structure of a firm is the ratio between debt and equity, which tells how the 
firm finances its operations and future growth. The optimal capital structure varies largely 
between firms depending on various determinants such as the industry in which the firm 
operates. (Brealey et al. 2011: 4, 343.) According to the estimations, the size of the global 
debt market exceeded $253 trillion at the end of 2019, whereas the size of the equity 
market was $85 trillion, representing only a third of the size of the debt market (Institute 
of International Finance 2020; CNBC 2019). The bond market accounted for almost half 
of the size of debt market with its size being $115 trillion (Institute of International 
Finance 2019). This illustrates the significance of corporate debt market as a source of 
external financing for firms (Menz 2010; Denis & Mihov 2003). 
 
Figure 1. Size of global debt and equity market in 2019.  
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The debt market consists of the private debt market and the public debt market. The 
lenders of private debt market can be further divided into banks and non-bank private 
lenders. (Denis et al. 2003.) The most common form of private debt are loans received 
from banks whereas corporate bonds are a typical source of debt financing from the public 
market.  
 
Figure 2. Financing of non-financial corporations in the EU and the U.S. (SIFMA 2020). 
 
 
Figure 2 above describes the proportions of bank lending and debt securities used in the 
financing of firms operating in all other industries except in the financial sector both in 
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financing sources used between firms in the EU and the U.S. In the EU loans received 
from banks cover 73% of firms’ debt financing and only 27% of funds is obtained from 
debt securities. The shares are nearly opposite in the U.S. where debt securities constitute 
a majority of debt financing with 79% and the share of bank lending is only a fifth of all 
debt financing with 21%. (SIFMA 2020.) These statistics indicate that the public debt 
market is much larger and more significant in the U.S. regarding firms’ debt financing 
needs. Conversely, the private debt market seems to be the main source of debt capital 
for firms in the EU countries. The differences between the two debt markets demonstrated 
by the aforementioned statistics further emphasize the importance of examining the 
European debt markets and how CSR information is regarded by the European creditors 
when pricing debt. Furthermore, while both the private and the public markets offer debt 
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capital for firms there are dissimilarities in how the cost on the debt is priced. 
 
 
3.2. Cost of debt 
 
Cost of debt is the interest rate that the creditor charges from the lender in addition to the 
principal. Interest rate is usually presented as an annual percentage rate. Financial risk is 
tightly related to the cost of debt. Essentially, the interest rate depicts the risk associated 
with the debt and it is determined in line with the trade-off between risk and return 
according to which high risk is rewarded with a high return. This means that if a loan is 
regarded to be low risk the interest rate charged on it should correspondingly be low.  
 
Debt can be divided into long-term debt and short-term debt. Long-term debt has a longer 
maturity and it is repaid to the creditor in more than one year. Firms use long-term debt 
for example to finance large projects. Conversely, short-term debt are financial 
obligations that the firm has to repay within a year. Short term debt is commonly used to 
finance the daily operations of a firm such as payroll or accounts payable. (Brealey et al. 
2011: 352.) 
 
In addition to the maturity of the loan, each form of debt financing has their own specific 
characteristics that affect the cost of debt. The features of both bank lending and corporate 
bonds will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1. Bank lending 
 
Bank lending is the most common form of debt acquired from the private debt market. A 
loan can be issued by either one bank or several banks. A loan provided by only one bank 
is called a bilateral loan. If the loan amount requested by a borrower is too large to be 
provided by one bank, two or more banks can jointly provide the loan. This kind of 
arrangement is called a syndicated loan and they are provided by investment banks and 
commercial banks. (Champagne & Coggins 2012: 1437; Brealey et al. 2011: 779.) 
 
When assessing the risk and the creditworthiness of a firm, banks often look at several 
factors related to the borrowing firm, the loan in question as well as the market in which 
the firm operates. These factors include both quantitative and qualitative factors. (Weber, 
Scholz & Michalik 2010.)  
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Some particularly important sources of information for banks when assessing the 
creditworthiness of a firm and its ability to repay the loan are the financial statements of 
a firm. The quality of the accounting information allows the banks to evaluate the firm’s 
performance and future cash flows. The accounting information also reveals the firm’s 
history with repayments as well as the amount of outstanding loans, which is important 
to know as high leverage is known to be associated with an increased probability of 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, based on the assessment of a firm’s financial standing banks 
can not only set a suitable interest rate but also customize the non-price terms of the loan 
to control for the evaluated riskiness of the loan. (Bharath, Sunder & Sunder 2008; 
Saunders 1999: 9.) Next to the financial statements, banks use credit ratings provided by 
credit rating agencies to evaluate the firm. The most recognised credit rating agencies are 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. A credit rating is an estimation of a firm’s level 
of default risk. (Brealey et al. 2011: 587.)  
 
In addition to evaluating the firm itself, banks assess the different qualities of the loan. 
The size and maturity of the loan, whether it is secured or not as well as the purpose for 
which the money will be used by the firm all affect the riskiness of the contract. A larger 
amount of loan increases the credit risk of the bank if the firm would fail to repay the 
loan. Furthermore, if the maturity of the loan is very long it the uncertainty regarding the 
future increases as does the risk of the borrower going bankrupt before the end of the loan 
contract. (Brealey et al. 2011: 353; Saunders 1999.) 
 
In case of a concern related to the firm’s ability to repay the loan, a bank may request the 
firm to provide a collateral for the loan, which is a security consisting of liquid assets. It 
is a usual practice especially related to long-term loans. (Brealey et al. 2011: 780.) 
Collaterals are used especially with firms that have a high risk of default. Firms in need 
of debt typically prefer the debt source from which they can receive debt with the lowest 
cost. Providing a collateral significantly decreases the cost of debt for low quality firms 
compared with the alternative of not providing a collateral for the bank. However, firms 
that decide to borrow with an unsecured bank loan are found to be unable to decrease 
their cost of debt even if they had provided a collateral. (Booth & Booth 2006.) 
 
The economic conditions of the country and industry in which the firm operates are also 
considered by banks. If the industry in which the firm operates is considered risky or 
exposed to changes in the business cycle banks may impose a higher interest rate on the 
debt than to a firm with a similar credit rating that operates in another industry. If changes 
in the industry would affect the value of the borrower on the equity market, it would have 
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an impact on the firm’s capability of repaying the loan. (Magananelli et al. 2017; Weber 
et al. 2010; Saunders 1999: 10.) Furthermore, characteristics related to the country, its 
political climate or reporting requirements can either increase or decrease the risk related 
lending (Carnevale & Mazzuca 2014). 
 
The private lending market is found to be informationally efficient, meaning that the 
banks consider new information quickly and accurately when pricing loans. Banks’ 
ability to have strong relationships with the borrowers gives them an advantageous 
position in comparison to other investors in obtaining and collecting new knowledge of 
the borrowers that is up to date and can be later reused. An indication of this is its ability 
to outperform both equity and bond markets in predicting a firm’s default. Banks ability 
to continuously monitor the financial standing of a firm lower the risk of information 
asymmetry in long-term banking relationships. This is beneficial also to the borrower as 
recurrent borrowing from the same bank is found to result in lower cost of debt (Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders & Srinivasan 2011; Allen, Guo & Weintrop 2004; Altman, Resti & 
Sironi 2004; Boot 2000).  
 
In the recent years, there has been increasingly new findings of banks considering CSR 
factors in their lending decisions. The results of Nandy and Lodh (2012) indicate that 
environmentally conscious firms with high environmental ratings receive loans from 
banks with better loan contract terms in comparison to firms with weak environmental 
performance. Further evidence indicating that the CSR actions of a firm have an effect 
on its creditworthiness was found by Weber et al. (2010). According to their results, the 
sustainability performance of the firm can predict the riskiness of issuing a loan together 
with traditional financial factors as a connection was identified between the sustainability 
performance and the credit default risk. With firms increasingly investing in CSR 
practices, taking these factors into consideration when assessing the credit risk of a firm 
can be reasoned. Further findings of previous studies regarding the connection between 
CSR performance and cost of debt will be presented in the following chapter of this thesis.  
 
3.2.2. Corporate bonds 
 
Corporate bond is a debt security that a firm issues to the public debt market in order to 
receive debt capital. In theory, anyone can invest in a bond and thus a bond can be held 
by multiple investors at the same time meaning that there can be hundreds or thousands 
of bondholders. A common form of a corporate bond is a coupon-paying bond. In 
exchange for obtaining debt, the firm pays the bondholders interest, known as coupons, 
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semi-annually or annually and when the bond matures, the bondholder receives the final 
interest payment as well as the principal of the bond. Furthermore, after the bond has been 
issued, it can be traded among investors in the financial markets. Corporate bonds are 
mostly used by large companies who have an access to the public debt markets. (Brealey 
et al. 2011: 2, 46.) 
 
The price of a bond that pays coupons is determined according to the following formula, 
 
(1) !" 	= 	 %&'( + %&'( * + ⋯+ %&'( , + -.&'( , 
 
where 	!" is the price of the bond at time = 0, / is the coupon payment, 0 is the discount 
rate, !1 is the par value of the bond and 2 is the number of periods. The interest rate of 
a bond is negatively correlated with the price of the bond, meaning that when the interest 
rates decline the price of the bond increases. This implies that the yield of the bond varies 
according to the changes in price making it challenging to compare different bonds only 
based on its price or interest rate. Therefore, investors looking to buy bonds are interested 
in the internal rate of return of a bond, which is called yield to maturity (YTM). Yield to 
maturity is a measure of the return that the investor will gain if he holds the bond until its 
maturity. Yield to maturity allows an investor to compare between bonds that have 
different coupons and maturities. (Brealey et al. 2011: 46−50; Fabozzi 2008: 214)  
 
Bond prices are affected by various factors related to the creditworthiness of the issuer of 
the bond as well as the characteristics of the bond and the terms and conditions on which 
the bond is issued. A bond indenture is the legal contract between the firm issuing a bond 
and the bondholder, which specifies all the terms and conditions on which the bond is 
issued. An indenture includes information of the bond’s maturity date and the firm’s 
commitments to the bondholder such as the timing of interest payments and how the 
interest is calculated. Furthermore, the indenture details whether the bond is secured or 
unsecured or the possible inclusion of embedded options. (Fabozzi 2008: 260.) 
 
The maturity of a bond can vary between one year and 30 years and the rate of return 
required by creditors is often higher for bonds with a long maturity compared to bonds 
with a short maturity. The term structure of interest rates, also known as the yield curve, 
is a term used to depict the difference between the interest rates of short-term bonds and 
long-term bonds. Generally, interest rates increase in accordance with the maturity, 
 30 
meaning that lenders require a higher interest rate for a long-term loan than short-term 
loan. This creates an upward sloping yield curve, which is a sign for investors of an 
expansionary economy. Conversely, a downward sloping yield curve is formed when the 
interest rates on short-term loans are higher than the interest rates on long-term loans. 
This is often a sign of a downturn in the economy. (Brealey et al. 2011: 53; Fabozzi 208.) 
 
As in bank loans, securities can also be attached to bonds. A secured bond requires a 
collateral from the firm issuing the bond in order to certify that the firm will repay the 
debt. Different assets of the firm can be used as a security on a bond including real 
property and machinery, inventory financial assets and accounts receivables. (Fabozzi 
2008: 260−261.) 
 
Embedded options define certain rights given to either the issuer of the bond or the 
bondholder that affect both parties if the right is exercised. An example of an embedded 
option is a callable bond, which gives the issuer a right to buy back the bond and repay 
the investor early at any time in the future. Conversely, a putable bond gives the 
bondholder a right to demand that the bond issuer repays the bond early. The holders of 
convertible bonds have the option of exchanging to the bond for the firm’s common 
stocks and therefore the coupon rate is usually lower compared to a bond without such 
option. (Brealey et al. 2011: 68, 605.) 
 
In addition to the terms and conditions of the bond agreement, an investor needs to 
evaluate also other risks affecting the investment such as the liquidity risk and the default 
risk. The corporate bond market is characterized by being more illiquid compared to both 
the government bond market and equity market. As the corporate bonds are not traded 
regularly and they are hard to sell on a short notice, the price of a corporate bond needs 
to reflect the liquidity risk. (Lin, Wang & Wu 2011; Edwards, Harris & Piwowar 2007: 
1450.) The most common way of measuring bond liquidity is the bid-ask spread, which 
measures the difference between the highest price that a buyer is ready to pay for the bond 
and the lowest price that a seller is ready to accept. For liquid bonds the bid-ask spread 
tends to be narrow. However, due to the weak availability of the bid-ask spread for mature 
bond or bonds that are not traded frequently, other means to measure the liquidity are 
needed. The liquidity of a bond can additionally be measured by the face value of a bond 
and the percentage of zero trading days. The face value illustrates the size of the bond 
and typically, a large bond is held by a large number of investors. A large pool of 
bondholders is likely to result in more trading of the bond, which increases the liquidity. 
The second measure, percentage of zero trading days, can be used as an indicator for the 
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trading activity regarding a certain bond. (Helwege, Huang & Wang 2014; Chen, 
Lesmond & Wei 2007.) 
 
Default risk or credit risk is the risk that a borrower would not be able to repay a loan or 
the interest of the loan for the investor. However, as the risks related to each firm and the 
firm’s ability to repay a debt are challenging to distinguish by an individual investor, 
corporate bonds are rated by credit rating agencies. Although the manner in which the 
credit ratings are presented vary by each agency the presentation still follows the same 
principle. The credit ratings are indicated with a system based on letters in which the bond 
with the highest credit rating and thus lowest risk is given a score of AAA. The lowest 
score, C or D depending on the credit rating agency, is assigned to a bond with the highest 
risk of default. Bonds with a credit rating of BBB or above are called investment grade 
bonds whereas bonds with a credit rating below BBB are known as non-investment grade 
bonds or junk bonds. (Brealey et al. 2011: 587.)  
 
 
3.3. Debt source decisions 
 
Firms’ debt source decisions between lending from a bank or issuing a bond on the public 
market require evaluation of the cost of debt, the terms of the contract as well as the 
availability of different sources.  
 
The research of Denis and Mihov (2003) examined how the firms decide between the 
different sources of debt with a dataset consisting of 1480 large publicly traded firms in 
the U.S. According to their findings the firm’s choice of debt is dependent on the credit 
quality of the firm. Firms with good credit quality are described to often possess the 
following qualities; they are large and well-performing firms with high credit ratings and 
their amount of fixed assets is greater compared to total assets. Low credit quality firms 
tend to have the opposite characteristics.  
 
The firms with the highest credit quality choose primarily to borrow from the public debt 
market. Moreover, the firms with average credit quality borrow from banks and the firms 
with low credit quality are most likely to obtain debt from the non-bank private lenders. 
The findings are explained with information asymmetry and the reputation of the 
borrower. Their findings also suggest that firms are likely to borrow from the same 
sources from which they have previously obtained funds. According to this finding, firms 
that have formerly borrowed from the public market have earned a reputation, which 
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lowers the information asymmetry between the firm and the creditor and eases borrowing 
the next time. Therefore, firms with low levels of information asymmetry favour public 
sources whereas firms with high levels of information asymmetry tend to receive loans 
from either banks or other private lenders. (Denis et al. 2003.) Similar results were 
obtained by Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2008) who examined the impact of accounting 
quality on the firm’s choice of debt market. Their findings indicate that firms with high 
accounting quality prefer public debt whereas low accounting quality firms obtain debt 
financing from private debt markets. Moreover, a partial explanation for low credit 
quality firms choosing to lend from banks instead of issuing bonds could be due to lack 
of alternatives as many large financial institutions such as commercial banks and pension 
funds are not permitted to invest in non-investment grade bonds (Brealey et al. 2011: 
587).  
 
Studies have also been conducted on the effect of banks’ private information on the cost 
of debt of firms. Santos and Winton (2008) find that firms that have previously issued 
bonds in the public market are likely to also benefit from a lower interest rate on bank 
loans. They also found evidence of banks increasing the cost of loan during a recession 
but the difference in the interest rate is much lower for firms that have access to the public 
debt market compared to firms that do not. This suggests that banks exploit their 
information and charge higher interest rates than from firms who have not issued debt on 
public market or have done so a long time ago and are consequently dependent on the 
bank loans. 
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This part presents the findings of previous research. During the past two decades the 
amount of literature related to CSR and its relation to financial risk and the cost of debt 
of firms has substantially increased. However, the findings seem inconsistent and vary 
depending on the market and the methodology applied. The first part discusses the effect 
that CSR is found to have on financial risk while the second part presents the findings of 
the relationship between CSR and firms’ cost of debt capital. 
 
According to the theories of asymmetric information and agency costs, superior 
responsibility performance should result in reduced financial risk, an ameliorated access 
to debt as well as a lower cost of debt. The theories presented in the second part of the 
thesis are partly supported by the empirical evidence, however, some contradictory 
evidence is also found. 
 
 
4.1. Impact of CSR on financial risk 
 
In their research Cheng, Ioannou & Serafeim (2014) examine what kind of an impact does 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance have on the capital constraints of a 
company. They define capital constraints as market frictions that hinder firms from 
obtaining the funding needed for investments. The ESG data used in the study is obtained 
from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and the sample includes firms from 49 countries such 
as Japan, the U.S., the U.K., China, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Australia as well as firms from Latin America and Continental Europe. Their findings 
conclude that firms with high CSR performance face lower capital constraints as they are 
better positioned to obtain financing and thus have an easier access to finance in capital 
markets. Furthermore, their findings demonstrate that both social and environmental 
factors have a positive impact on reducing the capital constraints. (Cheng et al. 2014.) 
 
According to Choi and Wang (2009) and Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) high CSR 
performance is connected to better stakeholder engagement which diminishes the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and thus the possible agency costs. The stakeholder 
engagement processes of a company indicate that mutual trust and collaboration are 
valued, both of which are the basis for long-term relationships. Having superior 
relationships with customers, business partners and employees may also positively affect 
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the financial performance of the company. Moreover, companies with higher CSR 
performance are found to be more willing to publish their actions regarding CSR 
(Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang 2011). This results in higher transparency and 
accountability lowering the information asymmetry between firms and investors. Having 
reduced capital constraints provides the firms with the opportunity to invest in projects 
that are estimated to be strategically beneficial and profitable that it otherwise would not 
be able to undertake. This may further boost the firms’ performance on the capital 
markets. (Cheng et al. 2014.) 
 
Sun and Cui (2014) study the relationship between CSR and firm default risk aiming to 
find out whether CSR has the capability of decreasing firms’ risks of falling into default. 
They find that CSR is strongly and negatively correlated to firm default risk meaning that 
CSR does help firms in reducing default risk. Furthermore, the relationship is stronger 
for firms operating in highly turbulent markets compared to firms operating in low 
turbulent markets. This suggests that CSR is considered an insurance-like asset that has 
the ability to protect the firm during turbulent periods in the financial markets. In addition, 
they find that CSR activities that benefit the society result in a lower cost of debt and a 
higher credit rating.  
 
The connection between CSR and firm risk in controversial industries, such as alcohol, 
tobacco, weapons and gambling, in the U.S. is examined by Jo and Na (2012b). As firm 
risk is considered to be a greater concern for firms operating in controversial industries 
than in non-controversial firms, their research also studies whether CSR activities have a 
similar impact on both controversial and non-controversial industry firms. The study 
finds that the risk-reduction effect is more significant for controversial industry firms 
compared to the non-controversial industry firms. The study concludes that engaging in 
CSR activities reduces the firm risk also for controversial industry firms, thus supporting 
the firm’s risk management.  
 
 
4.2. Impact of CSR on cost of debt 
 
The impact of CSR on cost of debt capital has been studied in several academic papers. 
The research conducted by Erragragui (2018) examines the relationship between 
corporate social performance (CSP) and the cost of debt of firms in the United States. 
According to his findings, only few factors of the CSP distinguish as factors that investors 
are interested in when assessing the credit risk of a firm. Environmental concerns are 
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found to increase firms’ cost of debt as it increases the creditors’ perception of default 
risk whereas governance concerns do not affect it. Furthermore, having a strong 
performance in environmental and governance issues lowers the firm’s cost of debt. 
These results suggest that creditors do not place importance equally on governance 
strengths and governance concerns. Goss and Roberts (2011) also conduct a study on the 
relation between corporate social responsibility and bank debt in the U.S. According to 
their results companies that are associated with CSR concerns have 7 to 18 basis points 
higher cost of debt than companies with a higher CSR performance. This indicates that 
banks regard CSR concerns as risks and will price debt accordingly. Furthermore, firms 
that are considered as low-quality borrowers that engage in voluntary CSR spending will 
be offered less attractive loan contract terms such as a shorter maturity. However, same 
does not apply with high-quality borrowers making similar investments in CSR activities.   
 
Hsu and Chen (2015) concur with the results of the above-mentioned studies. They study 
the relation between corporate social responsibility performance and financial risk using 
data of the largest 3000 U.S.-based companies. Activities related to CSR are found to 
reduce both financial risk and agency costs as they improve the information asymmetry 
between the firm and its stakeholders. High CSR performers are found to benefit from 
being socially responsible. This can be observed in the higher credit risk ratings and lower 
cost of debt compared to companies with weak CSR performance. These results are due 
to lower agency costs, improved information transparency and reduced bankruptcy risk 
that are related to superior CSR performance.  
 
Similar results are obtained by Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin (2014) who examine the 
effects of corporate social performance (CSP) on the pricing of corporate debt and credit 
ratings in the U.S. market. The results of their study indicate that good CSP can decrease 
the risk premium related to corporate bonds which leads to a lower cost of corporate debt. 
The factors found to have an impact on reducing the risk premium associated with the 
corporate bonds were supporting local communities, an increased level of marketed 
product safety and quality and avoiding disputes with the employees of the firm. Their 
results are found to be robust across different industries. Moreover, higher CSP 
performance is found to result in improved credit quality and decreased perceived credit 
risk. Superior CSP is recompensed with lower corporate bond yields and inferior CSP is 
penalized with higher corporate bond yields. Corporate social performance and the yield 
spreads are more significantly negative for bonds with a long maturity. This indicates that 
the financial benefits gained with a good CSP is realized in the long term. (Oikonomou, 
Brooks & Pavelin 2014.) 
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The results of a research conducted by Al-Hadi, Chatterjee, Yaftian, Taylor and Hasan 
(2017) are in accordance to the results of Erragragui (2018) and Hsu et al. (2015). Al-
Hadi et al. study the relationship between CSR performance and financial distress of 
publicly listed Australian firms. Furthermore, they test whether the life cycle stage of the 
firm is associated with the results. According to their findings, high CSR performance 
has a significantly negative relation with financial distress. In other words, firms with 
positive CSR performance have a better access to finance and a lower cost of capital. 
Moreover, their findings indicate that the negative relationship is more distinct for firms 
in the later stages of the life cycle, suggesting that the more mature firms are not 
associated with CSR issues and risks as much as firms in the earlier life cycle stages. Thus 
engaging in CSR activities can reduce the risk associated with the earlier life cycle stages. 
 
Orens, Aerts and Cormier (2010) study the effects of voluntary Web-based non-financial 
disclosure on the cost of capital for large listed firms in North America as well as 
Continental Europe. Overall, voluntary non-financial reporting is found to positively 
affect the cost of capital. According to their findings, Continental European firms with 
high levels of Web-based non-financial reporting are more likely to also benefit from 
having a lower lever of information asymmetry. Furthermore, a significant negative 
relationship between Web-based non-financial reporting and cost of debt persists for 
firms in Continental Europe, meaning that the cost of debt is lower for firms who disclose 
non-financial information in the Web. However, these findings do not hold for the North 
American firms. The research of Sengupta (1998) finds supporting evidence that firms 
with superior disclosure quality ratings have a lower interest rate on debt. Furthermore, 
their results indicate that financial analysts’ dependence on the disclosures is accentuated 
when the market uncertainty around the firm is high.  
 
Further European evidence regarding the impact of CSR disclosure on the cost of debt is 
presented by Hamrouni, Uyar and Boussaada (2019). They examine French corporations 
listed in the SBF 120 index between 2010 and 2015 using data obtained from Bloomberg. 
According to their findings, the combination of ESG disclosure scores is negatively 
related to the cost of debt. However, when the dimensions of ESG are examined 
separately, only environmental performance lowers the cost of debt, whereas social 
performance is found to increase the cost of debt and governance score has no effect on 
the cost of debt. Furthermore, their results indicate that creditors take into consideration 
the CSR reports of a firm when assessing its creditworthiness. The research of Nandy and 
Lodh (2012) finds supporting evidence that banks take firms’ environmental performance 
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into account when making loan decisions. They use the data of 1026 firms in the U.S. 
between 1991 and 2006.Their results suggest that firms with superior environmental 
performance receive more favourable loan contracts compared to firms with low 
environmental performance.  
 
Contrary results are reached by Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) who also study the 
connection between corporate social performance and cost of debt from a data set 
consisting of 332 companies worldwide. Their findings demonstrate a positive 
relationship between corporate social performance and cost of debt meaning that firms 
with superior corporate social performance are associated with higher cost of debt. This 
indicates that financial institutions deem firms’ CSR activities as unnecessary costs rather 
than risk reducing factors. Their findings thus support the overinvestment theory. Similar 
results were also obtained by Sharfman et al. (2008) who found that increased 
environmental risk management contributes to a higher cost of debt capital using the data 
of S&P 500 firms.  
 
Further evidence of CSR performance not being considered by creditors is provided by 
the findings of Menz (2010) who studied the effect of CSR on the pricing of European 
corporate bonds using the data retrieved from SAM Research. According to the results of 
his research firms with high CSR performance do not have a lower cost on debt that is 
acquired from the public debt market indicating that CSR performance is not incorporated 
in the prices of corporate bonds.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to comprehensively introduce the data and methodology 
used in this research. The first part of this chapter provides information on the data 
provider, the ESG scores and how the scores have been formed and evaluated. Moreover, 
descriptive statistics as well as data diagnostics are presented. Finally, the regression 
models are formed and described.  
 
 
5.1. Description of data 
 
To test the hypothesis of this study, the data are selected based on a few requirements. In 
order to be able to approximate the capital costs the firms need to be large publicly traded 
firms. Furthermore, being publicly traded allows a more transparent view on how the 
firms manage risks related to sustainability. 
 
Based on the requirements, this thesis uses the data retrieved from the ASSET4 database 
of Thomson Reuters. The Thomson Reuters ASSET4 is a panel dataset that provides 
annual environmental, social and governance performance ratings for over 7000 publicly 
traded companies globally starting from year 2002. In Europe there are over 1200 
companies that have been evaluated by Thomson Reuters. The assessment of the 
companies is done by research analysts who aim to present objective, transparent and 
comparable ESG information. Thus, all the data that is used in the evaluations is publicly 
available. Over 900 evaluation points are used for each firm to determine the firm’s 
performance on sustainability issues and to create uniform scores that range from 0 to 
100, with 100 being the highest possible score. This ensures that the data is up-to-date, 
comparable and valid for quantitative analysis. (Thomson Reuters 2019.) The same 
dataset has also been used by other studies related to corporate social responsibility such 
as Cheng et al. (2014) and Eccles et al. (2014).  
 
In addition, other necessary financial and company variables needed in the research are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. The interest expense is acquired from the 
same database and it is calculated by dividing the interest expense on debt with the total 
debt.  
 
The initial data set comprises of annual ESG measures for publicly listed firms over the 
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period of 2002-2018 in 7 European markets. The markets included in the research were 
chosen to include some of the most central European indices from Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. The data includes listed firms 
from Xetra, DAX 30, CAC 40, FTSE 100, Nasdaq Stockholm, Nasdaq Copenhagen, 
Nasdaq Helsinki and Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
Initially, the data set consists of 2056 firms, however, most of them have not been 
evaluated for their ESG performance and they lack an ESG score. Thus, these firms have 
not been considered in the research. The sample is further outlined by removing firms 
that do not have information on interest rates. Furthermore, firms with extreme values of 
over 100% in interest rates are left out of the sample in order to prevent the extreme values 
affecting the results of the research. In addition for controlling for the extremely high 
interest rates, 0.5% of the extremes of both the highest and lowest values of all variables 
are removed from the data. This is done in order to secure that the outcomes will not be 
biased due to possible outliers. To ensure that the data includes each firm only once, all 
of the indices and exchanges have been checked for duplicates. For example, all of the 
duplicate firms that are listed both in Xetra and DAX 30 have been removed. In addition, 
leaving the dead firms out of the final sample would create a significant survivorship bias. 
Therefore, all firms, both active and dead, with at least five years of ESG data are selected 
to the final sample, which includes altogether 346 unique firms. The final sample is an 
unbalanced panel dataset. Table 2 presents the description of sample with information of 
the initial and final sample.  
 
Table 2. Description of sample. 
  Number of listed firms Number of firms with ESG rating 
   
CAC 40 41 36 
DAX 30 30 26 
FTSE 100 100 92 
Nasdaq Copenhagen 306 27 
Nasdaq Helsinki 236 29 
Nasdaq Stockholm 571 60 
Oslo Stock Exchange  473 27 
Xetra 299 49 
   
Total 2056 346 
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Table 3 illustrates the distribution of ESG ratings across years. The number of ESG 
ratings increases steadily over the sample period. In year 2017 the amount of firms 
evaluated has almost doubled compared to year 2002, which is the first year of the data. 
However, in year 2018 ESG scores are not available for a large part of the firms compared 
to the previous years. This could be a consequence of the firms not having published their 
annual reports yet or that the analysis of Thomson Reuters is not yet available for all of 
the companies. Nevertheless, the rising amount of observations illustrates the increase in 
the attention that CSR issues and the implementation of such activities has received in 
the past decade.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of ESG ratings across years.  
Year  N 
    
2002 179 
2003 181 
2004 238 
2005 288 
2006 293 
2007 304 
2008 314 
2009 316 
2010 326 
2011 333 
2012 336 
2013 339 
2014 338 
2015 337 
2016 331 
2017 331 
2018 120 
    
Total 4904 
 
 
Appendix 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the firms with ESG ratings in the sample 
by market and industry. The sectors of the firms are retrieved from the data based on 
which the firms are assigned to 10 industries according to the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). The highest ESG scores are found in the French stock market index 
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CAC 40 with the average overall ESG score being 86.07. The firms belonging to the stock 
exchanges of Xetra and Copenhagen have the lowest ESG scores, with the overall ESG 
score being 56.20 for Xetra and 56.92 for Copenhagen.  
 
In addition to the ESG ratings, Appendix 1 also presents the mean cost of debt both based 
on the market as well as the industry. The mean cost of debt is calculated as the ratio 
between the interest expense of debt and total debt for each firm over the period 
2002−2018. Out of all the markets the firms belonging to CAC 40 have the lowest mean 
cost of debt of 3.86%. The highest mean cost of debt, 7.91%, is found at the German 
exchange Xetra. Thus, it seems that the markets containing firms with overall lowest ESG 
scores, such as Xetra, have also the highest mean cost of debt. Similarly, the markets with 
the highest ESG scores, such as CAC 40, seem to have the lowest mean cost of debt. This 
suggests that the hypothesis is based on the right assumptions and an inverse relationship 
between the CSR performance and cost of debt can be expected.  
 
As opposed to the markets, the differences in the levels of cost of debt are quite small 
between different industries. The lowest mean cost of debt is 4.83% in the industry of 
financials whereas the highest mean cost of debt is 6.86% in the industry of oil and gas. 
Based on this observation we assume that the impact of CSR performance on the cost of 
debt is correspondingly not significantly different between industries. Therefore, 
differences between industries are not studied separately in this research.  
 
 
5.2. Regression variables  
 
The regression variables used in this research are presented in this section. The ESG 
rating of each firm is the single most important explanatory variable. The rest of the 
variables used in this research are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
5.2.1. Dependent variables 
 
Cost of debt (CoD) 
The total debt used in this thesis consists of all interest bearing and capitalized lease 
obligations and it includes both short-term debt as well as long-term debt. The dependent 
variable, the cost of debt (CoD), is calculated as the ratio between the interest expense of 
debt and the total debt and expressed as an annual percentage. According to Erragragui 
(2018) the credit rating of a firm is not considered to be a suitable proxy for the cost of 
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debt because it is mostly used for credit risk pricing in the market for bonds. Thus, instead 
of using credit ratings the accounting cost of debt is utilized for both bank loans as well 
as corporate bonds. Cost of debt is expected to have a negative relationship with ESG 
ratings.  
 
5.2.2. Independent variables  
 
The independent variables used in this research are depicted in Figure 3 and include the 
overall ESG score as well as the three dimensions that the ESG score consists of, which 
are environmental, social and governance criteria. Furthermore, each dimension includes 
various sub-criteria that have been assessed separately by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 in 
order to get the final score. Each of the ESG scores are tested individually in order to find 
out, whether one factor has a more significant impact on how the creditors regard the 
risks of the firms, thus affecting the pricing of debt, compared to the others. These tests 
are based on the methodology of Erragragui (2018). 
 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the ESG metrics. (Thomson Reuters 2019.) 
 
 
ESG score 
In order to test the overall ESG performance of a firm, each firm is assigned a ESG score 
based on the sub-criteria evaluations of the three dimensions; environmental, social and 
governance. The ESG score is an overall score that combines all of these three 
dimensions. (Thomson Reuters 2019.) 
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Environmental score 
The environmental score assesses the effect that a firm has on the nature. In addition to 
evaluating the direct impact of the firm’s actions on the environment the score measures 
the firm’s capability of managing the risks related to environmental issues as well as 
taking advantage of environmental opportunities to be able to create value for the 
shareholders. The environmental score of Thomson Reuters ASSET4 consists of three 
categories that are resource use, emissions and innovation. (Thomson Reuters 2019). The 
environmental score includes data for example about energy consumption, sourcing of 
raw materials, water treatment, carbon emissions and pollution as well as waste 
management and recycling (Clark et al. 2015: 12; Erragragui 2018).  
 
Social score 
The social score assesses the relation between the firm and its employees, customers and 
society. The firm’s ability to create shareholder value is measured in the trustworthiness 
and reputation of the firm. The Thomson Reuters ASSET4 environmental score is divided 
into four categories that are workforce, human rights, community and product 
responsibility. (Thomson Reuters 2019.) The social score includes data about relations 
with community and customers, employee turnover, health and safety policies including 
the amount of accidents and injuries, diversity of employees and the amount of training 
hours to mention a few (Clark et al. 2015: 12; Erragragui 2018).  
 
Governance score 
The governance score is used to evaluate firm’s performance in matters related to 
corporate governance. It assesses the firm’s management and reporting processes in order 
to ensure that the leadership acts according to the best interest of the owners of the firm. 
In the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database the governance score is further divided into 
three categories which are management, shareholders and CSR strategy. (Thomson 
Reuters 2019.) Some of the measured factors include information about accounting and 
reporting controversies, board structure, executive compensation, transparency and 
bribery (Clark et al. 2015: 12; Erragragui 2018).  
 
The categories of the environmental, social and governance scores described above 
contain numerous indicators that evaluate the performance of the firm on issues related 
to the category. The category score is determined as the equally-weighted sum of all 
relevant indicators for each industry. Furthermore, the weight of each category in the final 
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score is calculated by the amount of indicators in a category compared to the total amount 
of indicators evaluated in the score. (Thomson Reuters 2019.) 
 
Figure 4 below depicts the evolution of the ESG scores from 2002 to 2018 for the whole 
sample. The scores presented in the table are calculated yearly as the average of all 
available scores. Overall, the figure shows that all the dimensions of ESG have 
significantly improved over the years which is an evidence of firms’ growing attention 
towards sustainability issues. The improved ESG scores indicate that firms have 
increasingly invested in CSR activities. Moreover, the financial crisis of 2008 did not 
negatively impact any other scores except for the governance score. Nevertheless, the 
decline was relatively small, and already by the following year the score had increased 
by several points. These inferences are supported by the study of Jacob (2002) who found 
that partly due to the financial crisis, the firms were forced to become more transparent 
regarding their operations and activities. Consequently, improvements were seen in areas 
such as organizational governance, compensation policies and environmental policies. 
However, an aberration of the growth trend of the ESG scores can be noticed in year 
2018. Due to a very limited amount of ESG scores in the year 2018 the average of the 
ESG scores cannot be viewed as a representation of a larger trend. In 2018 ESG scores 
were obtained for only 120 firms whereas in the preceding year there are scores for 331 
firms.  
 
Figure 4. Evolution of ESG scores during 2002-2018. 
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5.2.3. Control variables 
 
Based on earlier studies (Erragragui 2018; Magnanelli et al. 2017; Oikonomou et al. 2014; 
Cheng et al. 2014; Goss et al. 2011) a number of firm-specific control variables are 
included in the regression models. Several of these variables are associated with assessing 
the risk profile of a firm.  
 
Leverage 
Firm leverage is measured by dividing total debt with common equity capital. Firm 
leverage is considered in the model as a high degree of leverage is found to be correlated 
with an increased probability of bankruptcy. (Erragragui 2018; Oikonomou et al. 2014.) 

Firm size 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Erragragui 2018; Cheng et 
al. 2014). The size of a firm is controlled as previous studies (Goss et al. 2011) have 
presented evidence that large firms have a lower risk profile compared to smaller firms 
(Magnanelli et al. 2017). 
 
Operating profitability 
Operating profitability is expressed as the Return on Investments (3456,8) ratio. Based on 
previous studies (Magnanelli et al. 2017) ROI is expected to be negatively correlated with 
the cost of debt. 
 
Book-to-market 
Book-to-market ratio can be used as an indicator of firms’ growth perspectives. Economic 
growth is seen as a sign of lower risk of default that could result in lower interest rates on 
debt. Book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing common shareholders’ equity by 
market capitalization. (Erragragui 2018.) 
 
Fixed effects 
Following Cheng et al. (2014) and Magnanelli et al. (2017) the model is also controlled 
for market, industry and year fixed effects. The market of a firm is considered in the 
models as the institutional pressure on the CSR reporting of a firm may vary between 
different countries in Europe. In this study the market is determined on the basis of the 
exchange where the firm is listed. Furthermore, the changing macroeconomic conditions 
could also have an impact on the cost of debt. (Carnevale & Mazzuca 2014.) The industry 
sector of a firm is also taken into account as there is previous evidence that banks could 
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impose higher interest rates on debt for firms that operate in industries with high risks 
despite the firm having alike credit ratings with a firm operating in a different industry 
sector (Magananelli et al. 2017; Longstaff & Schwartz 1995). 
 
Table 4. Data description of the sample.  
  Mean Median SD (9) Min Max 
		 		 		 		 		 		
ESG score 72.82 84.41 25.98 2.66 99.11 
            
Environmental score 73.09 86.47 26.32 8.42 97.40 
            
Social score 72.73 83.61 25.39 3.97 99.31 
            
Governance score 58.79 63.04 26.43 1.87 97.94 
            
Cost of debt 5.83 % 4.62 % 6.95 % 0.18 % 98.91 % 
            
Leverage  129.42 64.50 225.42 -919.69 1 729.79 
            
Firm size 16.50 16.39 1.89 10.62 21.70 
            
Operating profitability  10.22 % 8.90 % 11.16 % -45.39 % 67.26 % 
            
Book-to-market 0.62 0.50 0.48 -0.08 3.90 
		 		 		 		 		 		
 
Table 4 presents the regression variables and the descriptive statistics of the final sample 
of 346 firms.  
 
 
5.3. Data diagnostics 
 
To ensure that the hypothesis is tested with the right methods and regression models, data 
diagnostics is carried out on the sample. In order to form reliable ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression models we need to certify that the underlying assumptions are not 
violated. One of these assumptions is that none of the independent variables is correlated 
with the error term. Therefore, random effects test is performed. If endogenous variables 
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would be detected, the model would fail the OLS assumptions. Another assumption of 
the model is that the error term has a constant variance, which means that the variance 
does not alter between observations. This condition is known as homoskedasticity and 
the violation of it is called heteroskedasticity. Thus, we need to run tests in order to 
confirm whether or not there are heteroskedastic residuals. Furthermore, the according to 
the assumptions of OLS the model cannot contain perfect multicollinearity. Perfect 
multicollinearity would occur if an independent variable is a perfect linear function of 
another explanatory variable. Therefore, a test for correlation between variables is 
performed. (Wooldridge 2012: 349−355.) 
 
Before determining the most suitable regression method, it is essential to know whether 
the independent variables are endogenous. Therefore, cross-sectional dependence is 
tested using the Hausman specification test. Based on the results we can determine 
whether to use random or fixed effects in the model. The null hypothesis of the test is that 
the random effects model is valid. This implies that there is no correlation between the 
regressors and error terms. Conversely, fixed effects model should be used if the null 
hypothesis is rejected. (Hausman 1978.)  
 
The results of the Hausman specification test are presented in Panel A in Table 5. The p-
value of the test is smaller than 0.001 and thus the null hypothesis is rejected meaning 
that there is correlation between the regressors and error terms. Consequently, fixed 
effects will be implemented in the models used in this research.  
 
Heteroskedasticity is tested with running the two most commonly used methods; the 
Breusch-Pagan test, which is based on the Lagrangian multiplier test, and the White test. 
These tests are used to examine the dependency of the variance of the standard errors on 
the values of the independent variables. If there is dependency between the two it is an 
indication of the presence of heteroskedasticity. The presence of heteroskedasticity may 
cause challenges in the form of biased standard error and inaccurate results, both of which 
will result in erroneous interpretation about the significance of the regression coefficients. 
Therefore, in the presence of heteroskedasticity it is important to utilize robust regression 
models. (Breusch & Pagan 1979; White 1980.) 
 
The null hypothesis for both the Breusch-Pagan and the White test is that the variances 
for errors are all equal. The results for both tests are presented in Panel B in Table 5. As 
the p-values of both Breusch-Pagan and the White tests are smaller than 0.001 we reject 
the null hypothesis. In other words, heteroskedasticity is present in the data sample. 
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As previously mentioned, heteroskedasticity causes standard errors to be biased and 
inconsistent. Having robust standard errors eases the assumptions of having independent 
and identically distributed standard errors. Thus, robust standard errors are utilized in 
order to control for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependency as they tend to be 
more reliable and consequently generate more trustworthy results even when the error 
terms are heteroskedastic. (Hoechle 2007.) Robust standard errors are applied in the 
construction of the regression models of this research.  
 
Table 5. Results of the data diagnostics tests.  
Panel A         
          
Hausman test          
  Fixed Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
          
ESG score -0,004 -0,010 0,000 0,000 
Leverage -0,004 -0,003 0,000 0,000 
Firm size -0,470 -0,469 0,000 0,806 
Book-to-market 1,095 1,057 0,002 0,334 
Operating profitability 0,077 0,079 0,000 0,135 
          :² 70,56       
df 5       
Prob. 0,000       
          
Panel B         
          
  F-statistic Obs*R² df Prob. 
          
Breusch-Pagan test 10,261 50,799 5 0,000 
          
White test 5,407 106,118 20 0,000 
          
 
 
In addition to conducting the tests for random effects and heteroskedasticity, the presence 
of multicollinearity needs to be tested. Correlation between variables is tested by running 
the Pearson correlation matrix, which is presented in the table found in Appendix 2. 
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Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated by dividing the covariance between two 
variables by the product of the standard deviations of the two variables. The correlation 
values vary between -1 and 1, where -1 signifies perfect negative linear correlation and 1 
perfect positive linear correlation. The value of zero means that there is no linear 
correlation. The correlation matrix is used to determine whether there is multicollinearity 
in the sample. Multicollinearity is detected if two or more variables are highly correlated. 
(Wooldridge 2012: 95, 739.) 
 
Expectedly, the results indicate that there is high correlation between the overall ESG 
score and its three dimensions, the environmental, social and governance scores. The 
correlations between the three dimensions and the overall ESG score range from 0.67 to 
0.87. However, the correlations between the environmental, social and governance scores 
are smaller and not likely to cause multicollinearity problems. Therefore, the regression 
models are formed separately for the overall ESG score and the three dimensions that it 
consists of. All of the ESG scores are negatively correlated with the cost of debt, which 
suggests that higher CSR performance decreases the interest rate on debt. 
 
 
5.4. Regression models 
 
The regression models formed to test the relationship between firms’ CSR performance 
and cost of debt are presented below. CSR performance is measured using the ESG 
ratings. Following the methodology of Erragragui (2018), Magnanelli et al. (2017) as well 
as Sengupta (1998) a lag time effect of one year is applied between the dependent variable 
of cost of debt and the independent variable of ESG rating. This is due to the assumption 
that changes in firms’ CSR actions tend to have an impact in the long time period rather 
than immediately. Moreover, it takes at the minimum one year for financial institutions 
such as banks to assess and consider the impact of the changes in the CSR actions in their 
decision-making.  In this thesis the dependent variable, cost of debt of a firm, is measured 
as the rate of interest paid. As stated before, this is calculated by dividing the interest 
expense on debt with total debt. The control variables included in the regression model 
are at time t as based on the assumptions of efficient market hypothesis there is an 
immediate impact in the same year in which the dependent variable, cost of debt, is 
applied (Maganelli et al. 2017). The result of the Hausman specification test supports the 
use of fixed effects estimation model contrasted with random effects model. Therefore, 
market, industry and year fixed effects are applied to all models.  
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The first regression model tests whether ;<=6,8>&explains the cost of debt at time ?. In 
other words, it is used to test whether having a high ESG score in the previous year gives 
firms an advantage in the following year in the form of a lower interest rate on debt. The 
model assumes that there is a linear relationship. Following the research of Erragragui 
(2018), the relationship is examined with the following regression model, 
 
 
(2) /@A6,8 = B8 + 	C18	 ;<=6,8>& + 	C28	 /@2?0@F	GH0IHJFKL6,8 +MINKO	KPPKQ?L +	R6,8	
 
 
where /@A6,8 is the cost of debt issued in year t, measured by dividing the interest expense 
on debt with total debt, ;<=6,8>& is the ESG score announced at the end of year t-1, a 
measure of ESG performance over a one-year period, Control variables control for 
leverage, firm size, operating profitability and book-to-market ratio and Fixed effects 
control for year, industry and market-specific effects.  
 
The second model tests the impact of previous year’s environmental, social and 
governance scores on the cost of debt separately. This regression is formed with the aim 
of finding out whether any of these scores has a larger and more significant effect 
compared to the others. In order to discover whether creditors pay more attention to 
certain responsibility issues when issuing a loan, the following regression model is 
formed, 
 
 
(3) /@A6,8 = 	B8 + C18	 ;6,8>& + 	C28	 <6,8>& + 	C38	 =6,8>& +	C48	 /@2?0@F	GH0IHJFKL6,8 + 	MINKO	KPPKQ?L +	R6,8	
 
 
where /@A6,8 is the cost of debt issued in year t, ;6,8>& is the environmental score at the 
end of year t-1, a measure of environmental performance over a one-year period, <6,8>& is 
the social score at the end of year t-1, a measure of social performance over a one-year 
period, =6,8>& is the governance score at the end of year t-1, a measure of governance 
performance over a one-year period, Control variables control for leverage, firm size, 
operating profitability and book-to-market ratio and Fixed effects control for year, 
industry and market-specific effects. 
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The third and fourth model of this research are built on a method adopted from the 
research of Humphrey et al. (2012) where portfolios are constructed using an approach 
of best and worst firms of sector. This means identifying the best and the worst ESG 
performing firms in each of the 10 ICB industries. Including all of the industry sectors 
certifies that there is no systematic exclusion of any industry. In order to test the 
hypotheses, the third and fourth models are tested with a binary logistic regression model. 
This method is suitable for testing data which contains a binary independent variable. A 
binary variable has only two possible outcomes, either pass or fail, which are expressed 
with the numbers 1 and 0. The binary logistics regression model tests how varying one of 
the independent variables while keeping the other independent variables fixed impacts 
the dependent variable, which in this research is the cost of debt.  
 
In the third model, two independent variables are used in the model, which are a high 
overall ESG score, which indicates whether the ESG score is in the top 25% in or a low 
overall ESG score, which indicates whether the ESG score is in the bottom 25% of the 
sample. The binary variables are created in a manner where the best and worst performing 
25% of the firms in the same industry get the value equal to 1. The other firms that do not 
fill the above-mentioned requirements get a value equal to 0. Comparing firms with their 
peers takes into account the different characteristics between industries. The impact of 
being among the top or bottom overall ESG performers in the preceding year on the cost 
of debt is studied with the following regression model, 
 
 
(4) /@A6,8 	= 	B8 + C18	 UIVℎ	;<=6,8>& + 	C28	 X@Y	;<=6,8>& +	C38	 /@2?0@F	GH0IHJFKL6,8 + 	MINKO	KPPKQ?L +	R6,8 
 
 
where /@A6,8 is the cost of debt issued in year t, ;<=6,8>& is the ESG score announced at 
the end of year t-1, High is a binary variable that is equal to one if the variable is in the 
top 25% of the sample, and equal to zero if the variable is not in the top 25% of the 
sample,Low is a binary variable that is equal to one if the variable is in the bottom 25% 
of the sample, and equal to zero if the variable is not in the bottom 25% of the sample, 
Control variables control for leverage, firm size, operating profitability and book-to-
market ratio and Fixed effects control for year, industry and market-specific effects. 
 
The fourth regression model tests the effect of each of the three ESG criterion, 
environmental, social and governance, separately on the cost of debt. This model aims at 
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finding out whether any of the individual criterion have a more significant impact on the 
cost of debt compared to the others. The binary variables are used for the top and bottom 
25% of each category’s (environmental, social and governance) performers as in the third 
model. If the firm’s performance in either environmental, social or governance issues is 
in the top or bottom 25%, the binary variable gets a value equal to 1. If not, the binary 
variable gets a value equal to zero. Whether being among the top or bottom performers 
in any of the three categories in the previous year impacts the cost of debt is examined 
with the following regression model, 
 
 
(5) /@A6,8 = 	B8 + 	C18	 UIVℎ	;6,8>& + 	C28	 X@Y	;6,8>& + 	C38	 UIVℎ	<6,8>& +	C48	 X@Y	<6,8>& + 	C58	 UIVℎ	=6,8>& + 	C68	 X@Y	=6,8>& +	C78	 /@2?0@F	GH0IHJFKL6,8 + MINKO	KPPKQ?L +	R6,8	,		
 
 
where /@A6,8 is the cost of debt issued in year t, ;6,8>& is the environmental score at the 
end of year t-1, <6,8>& is the social score at the end of year t-1, =6,8>& is the governance 
score at the end of year t-1, High is a binary variable that is equal to one if the variable is 
in the top 25% of the sample, and equal to zero if the variable is not in the top 25% of the 
sample,Low is a binary variable that is equal to one if the variable is in the bottom 25% 
of the sample, and equal to zero if the variable is not in the bottom 25% of the sample, 
Control variables control for leverage, firm size, operating profitability and book-to-
market ratio and Fixed effects control for year, industry and market-specific effects.  
 
The following chapter presents the results and an analysis of the findings. 
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6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
This part presents the results and analysis from the regression models that are created in 
order to understand the effect that ESG ratings have on the cost of debt in the European 
market. The four models specified in the previous section are tested for the whole sample. 
As several of the firms included in the sample do not have ESG ratings for all of the years 
included in the time period of the sample, the panel data is unbalanced. Therefore, the 
impact of ESG scores on the cost of debt of a firm is tested using pooled OLS regressions 
for 346 firms listed in 7 European markets. Out of the whole sample 16 firms are 
considered as sin stocks. 
 
 
6.1. Regression results 
 
Following the methods of previous studies (Oikonomou et al. 2014) the models are tested 
using pooled OLS regressions. The first regression tests how the overall ESG score is 
correlated with the cost of debt. The results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that the 
overall ESG performance of a firm does not have an impact on the cost of debt. Even if 
the overall ESG score did not provide significant results in the first model, the effect of 
the individual scores is tested in the second model. Consistently, the majority of the 
individual scores do not have significant effects on the cost of debt. Exceptionally, the 
governance score is significant at the 5% level and inversely correlated with the cost of 
debt, which means that an increase in the governance score results in a lower cost of debt. 
The impact is -0.01 percentage points meaning that if the governance performance of a 
firm increases by 10 points, the cost of debt decreases by 0.1 percentage points. However, 
the effect is quite small and only valid when the model is fixed for year and industry 
effects. 
 
All the control variables, which include firm leverage, firm size, operating profitability 
and book-to-market, are highly significant at the 1% level. Based on the results of 
previous studies, this outcome was expected.   
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Table 6. Regression results for ESG scores. 
            
  ( 2 )   ( 3 ) 
            
Intercept 12.798*** 13.939***   12.815*** 14.413*** 
  (1.003) (1.275)   (1.019) (1.305) 
ESG score (-1) 0.003 -0.003       
  (0.004) (0.004)       
Environmental score (-1)       0.003 0.001 
        (0.007) (0.006) 
Social score (-1)       0.001 0.007 
        (0.006) (0.006) 
Governance score (-1)       0.001 -0.010** 
        (0.005) -0.004 
Leverage -0.003*** -0.003***   -0.003*** -0.004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm size -0.517*** -0.645***   -0.525*** -0.687*** 
  (0.067) (0.084)   (0.069) (0.086) 
Operating profitability 0.077*** 0.073***   0.077*** 0.073*** 
  (0.015) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015) 
Book-to-market 1.186*** 0.832***   1.189*** 0.859*** 
  (0.197) (0.193)   (0.193) (0.190) 
Fixed effects           
Year Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Market Yes No   Yes No 
Industry No Yes   No Yes 
      
R² 0.11 0.11  0.11 0.11 
Adjusted R² 0.11 0.11   0.11 0.11 
N 4447 4447   4446 4446 
            
Robust standard errors are marked below the corresponding correlation coefficient in 
parentheses. 
Levels of significance: * = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01       
 
 
The results for the third and fourth regression models are presented below in Table 7. The 
third model uses two binary independent variables, high and low ESG, which are 
constructed using the overall ESG scores of the firms that are among the best and worst 
performing 25% of the sample. The coefficients in both models are negative but high 
statistical significance is only found in high ESG performance, which results in 0.54 
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percentage points lower cost of debt. In other words, the cost of debt of a firm belonging 
to the top 25% of the overall ESG performers decreases by 0.54 percentage points. 
 
Binary variables are also used in the fourth model to test the impact of the best and worst 
performing 25% of the sample in each dimension of the ESG score on the cost of debt. 
The findings show that out of twelve variables four are found to be statistically 
significant. The results for high social performance are nearly equal in both models, 
varying between -0.638 and -0.645 and both highly significant. This means, that high 
social performance results in 0.64 percentage points lower cost of debt. Interestingly, 
some inconsistent results are also obtained. Similar to high social performance also low 
social performance seems to lead to lower cost of debt of 0.54 percentage points when 
fixed effects include year and industry. Firms with both highest and lowest social scores 
gaining financial benefit in the form of equally lower cost of debt is quite contradictory. 
However, for the lowest performing firms the significance of the results is only at the 
10% level, whereas for the best performing firms the significance is at the 1% level in 
both models. In addition, the model with fixed effects for year and industry suggests that 
also firms with high governance performance obtain loans with a cost that is 0.28 
percentage points lower. The result is significant at the 10% level. Significant results are 
not found neither for high environmental performance nor low environmental 
performance, which suggests that environmental factors do not greatly affect the loan 
decisions of creditors.  
 
In order to test whether the lag time effect of one year was sufficient, the regressions were 
also tested with a lag time effect of two years. The results were not altered even if a lag 
time effect of two years was applied in order to test if the performance scores would be 
reflected later in the creditors’ decisions than originally assumed by the model. This 
suggests, that the creditors obtain new information relatively quickly and apply it in the 
following year. Due to the dataset containing a limited number of sin stocks, only 16 
firms, it was not possible to examine sin stocks separately.  
 
The adjusted R-squared, which is the percentage of total variance of the dependent 
variables explained by the regression model, is low, around 11%, for all the four models 
presented in Table 6 and Table 7. This is an indication of a weak linear fit for the model. 
However, even if the adjusted R-squared is low, the low p-values are still an indication 
of a significant relation between the dependent variable and the significant predictors. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared is on the same level as in the research of Erragragui 
(2018).   
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Table 7. Regression results for high and low ESG scores. 
 
  ( 4 )   ( 5 ) 
            
Intercept 13.683*** 13.958***   13.736*** 14.398*** 
  (1.062) (1.292)   (1.091) (1.350) 
High ESG (-1) -0.059 -0.538***       
  (0.162) (0.159)       
Low ESG (-1) -0.395 -0.120       
  (0.275) (0.255)       
High Environmental score (-1)       0.058 -0.027 
        (0.192) (0.191) 
Low Environmental score (-1)       -0.264 -0.229 
        (0.327) (0.318) 
High Social score (-1)       -0.638*** -0.645*** 
        (0.144) (0.146) 
Low Social score (-1)       -0.420 -0.539* 
        (0.320) (0.312) 
High Governance score (-1)       0.128 -0.277* 
        (0.198) (0.166) 
Low Governance score (-1)       -0.189 0.365 
        (0.278) (0.254) 
Leverage -0.003*** -0.003***   -0.003*** -0.004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size -0.535*** -0.622***   -0.525*** -0.637*** 
  (0.067) (0.067)   (0.069) (0.073) 
Operating profitability 0.079*** 0.078***   0.081*** 0.079*** 
  (0.014) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Book-to-market 1.089*** 0.808***   1.079*** 0.819*** 
  (0.188) (0.187)   (0.188) (0.189) 
Fixed effects           
Year Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Market Yes No   Yes No 
Industry No Yes   No Yes 
      
R² 0.11 0.11  0.12 0.11 
Adjusted R² 0.11 0.11   0.12 0.11 
N 4911 4911   4911 4911 
            
Robust standard errors are marked below the corresponding correlation coefficient in 
parentheses. 
Levels of significance: * = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01 
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6.2. Analysis of the results 
 
Over the past two decades there has been a steady increase in the amount of yearly ESG 
observations, which is a clear indication of firms’ growing attention towards CSR 
practices. Furthermore, the scores have improved consistently indicating increased 
investments in CSR activities. However, it can be challenging for firms to distinguish the 
adequate level of investments in CSR activities where the benefit gained is more 
significant compared to the expense.  
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that superior CSR performance is reflected on the cost 
of debt. The majority of the significant results were found for firms belonging to the top 
25% of the best performing firms. Firms belonging to the 25% of the firms with the best 
overall ESG scores are found to receive a 0.54 percentage points lower interest rate on 
debt. 
 
In addition to the high ESG performers, the results suggest that especially social 
performance is rewarded with a 0.64 percentage points lower cost of debt. This leads to 
the conclusion that firms wanting to gain benefits from CSR should invest particularly in 
social matters as doing so leads to an equally low cost of debt as having a high overall 
ESG score. Presumably, having a high overall ESG score requires considerably more 
investments in CSR activities in all three dimensions than having solely a high social 
score.  
 
Intriguingly, some inconsistency occurs in the results between the high social performers 
and the low social performers as also low social performance is found to result in a lower 
cost of debt of 0.54 percentage points. This implies that the financial benefit is almost of 
equal magnitude between the best and the worst performers. However, the result for the 
low social performers is only significant at the 10% level, while the result for the high 
social performers is highly significant at the 1% level. One explanation for the 
contradictory result could be that the perceived importance of the social performance 
when assessing firms’ financial standing and creditworthiness varies between creditors. 
In reference to the theories of CSR, this result suggests that some creditors consider high 
social performance an overinvestment and a waste of firm’s resources, which leads them 
to reward low social performance, while others regard high social performance as a risk 
mitigating factor, which is rewarded as a lower interest rate on debt. However, this is the 
only of the significant results that supports the overinvestment theory as none of the other 
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significant results suggests that firms with low ESG scores would accordingly have a 
lower cost of debt.  
 
Having high governance scores is also found to be beneficial, but the impact on the cost 
of debt is smaller compared to the high ESG score and the high social score. Contrary to 
expectations, superior performance in environmental issues does not have any impact, 
neither positive or negative, on the cost of debt.  
 
The outcome is similar to the findings of Hsu et al. (2015) and Goss et al. (2011) who 
find that firms with high CSR performance have a lower cost of debt compared to firms 
with low CSR performance. However, the results differ from the findings of Erragragui 
(2018) who finds that superior performance especially in environmental and governance 
issues leads to a lower cost of debt. The findings related to the environmental score are 
also in contrast with the results of Hamrouni et al. (2019) who find that the disclosure of 
environmental information is the only dimension of ESG that lowers the cost of debt. 
Furthermore, the results of low social score are also supported by their findings according 
to which social performance increases the cost of debt. Moreover, the results of this thesis 
indicate that ESG factors are priced effectively in the debt market as creditors seem to 
consider new CSR information rather quickly when making loan decisions.  
 
The results also support the conclusion of Goss et al. (2011) that banks regard CSR 
concerns as an increased financial risk. Thus, high CSR performance reduces the financial 
risk and consequently the cost of debt decreases. The reduction in the cost of debt can 
also be seen to result from the improved information asymmetry between the internal and 
external stakeholders that the publishing of CSR reports induces. Therefore, the outcome 
of this thesis supports the conflict resolution theory that states that the increased 
transparency reduces the information asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders 
such as the creditors. Furthermore, the decline in the levels of information asymmetry 
results in decreased agency costs. As more information, both financial and non-financial, 
is available of the firm and its practices, it is less challenging for creditors to assess the 
risks related to the firm.  
 
Support for the overinvestment theory is only found in the results for low social 
performance. Most of the results with significance find that superior CSR performance is 
rewarded with a lower cost of debt. Therefore, it seems that in general superior CSR 
performance is not considered an overinvestment but rather a risk mitigating factor that 
has potential to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and its creditors. To 
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conclude, the hypothesis of high ESG ratings being inversely related to cost of debt is 
supported by the findings of this thesis.  
 
 
6.3. Limitations  
 
Some limitations regarding this research can be identified. It is conceivable that firms 
could try to affect their ESG ratings. This however is rather unlikely as the evaluations of 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 are based on several sources and the company-reported data, 
which comprises of annual reports, CSR reports and company websites, is only one of 
these sources. Other third-party sources used include NGO websites, stock exchange 
filings and news sources (Thomson Reuters 2019). It would be difficult for a single firm 
to affect all of these third-party sources in an attempt to improve its ESG scores.  
 
Moreover, another potential drawback concerning the reliability of the data would occur 
if the ESG ratings would be biased based on the analysts’ erroneous perceptions and 
judgements. The objectivity of the data is important so that the data are comparable across 
companies and markets. In order to ensure the quality and objectivity of the data, 
Thomson Reuters has implemented a process to standardize and continuously improve 
the information. This involves both algorithmic as well as human actions throughout the 
processing of data. These processes include for example built-in error check logics for 
various data points when gathering ESG data, independent audits and management 
reviews. Furthermore, the analysts operate in different locations across the world and 
speak local languages which decreases the chances of linguistic misperceptions. 
(Thomson Reuters 2019.) 
 
Overall, the data of this study includes a large dataset of 346 companies operating in 
various industries in 8 European markets, which significantly reduces the chances that 
the results would represent only a certain industry or a firm. Moreover, the data covers 
16 years during the time period of 2002−2018.   
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The European consumers’ awareness regarding sustainability issues has increasingly 
spread in the past two decades changing the attitudes as well as consumption habits. 
Consumers consider the environment very important and they are ready to act in order to 
preserve it. Furthermore, they insist on businesses and institutions to participate and do 
their share by implementing CSR activities in their operations. (European Commission 
2017.) This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on corporate social 
responsibility by examining the effect that CSR performance has on the cost of debt. 
Regardless of the growing interest towards CSR, there are still varying findings on 
whether creditors consider the CSR performance of firms alongside financial factors 
when giving out loans. The main focus of this research is to examine whether a superior 
CSR performance measured with ESG scores results in financial benefit in the form of a 
lower cost of debt capital in the European market. In other words, is acting according to 
social norms financially beneficial and rewarded by creditors with a lower interest rate. 
This thesis utilizes the ESG data provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4. The impact of 
ESG ratings on the cost of debt of a firm is examined by studying 346 listed firms from 
8 European stock exchanges during the time period from 2002 to 2018. The study is 
conducted by running pooled OLS regressions on an unbalanced panel dataset.  
 
Previous research has largely concentrated on studying the impact of ESG on the cost of 
debt in the U.S. The findings of previous research suggest that there is a relationship 
between CSR performance and cost of debt. However, the results on whether higher 
responsibility scores are negatively or positively related to cost of debt vary. The results 
of several previous studies (Hamrouni et al. 2019; Erragragui 2018; Hsu et al. 2015; Goss 
et al. 2011) suggest that firms benefit from having high CSR performance scores in the 
form of a lower cost of debt. These results support the conflict resolution theory, which 
explains the lower cost of debt with high CSR performance increasing transparency which 
in turn decreases the levels of information asymmetry and the firms’ risk of going 
bankrupt (Cheng et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2014). However, the results are not as coherent 
when it comes to the effects of the single dimensions of ESG. Erragragui (2018) and 
Hamrouni (2019) find that strong environmental performance lowers the cost of debt 
whereas the results of Sharfman et al. (2008) indicate that increased environmental risk 
management is correlated with a higher cost of debt. Similarly contrasting results are also 
found for governance and social performance. Furthermore, some studies (Magnanelli et 
al. 2017; Sharfman et al. 2008) find evidence supporting the overinvestment theory, 
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which suggests that high CSR performance increases the cost of debt as investments in 
CSR activities are considered a waste of resources.  
 
In general, the results of this thesis align with the results of previous studies and suggest 
that CSR performance is reflected on the cost of debt. Especially firms that are among 
the 25% of the best overall ESG performers are found to receive a lower cost on debt. In 
addition to the high ESG performers, also high social performance is rewarded with a 
lower interest rate. The impact on the cost of debt is of equal size which indicates that a 
firm wanting to obtain savings on cost of debt through CSR should specifically focus 
investments in social matters in order to achieve a high social performance instead of 
aspiring to reach a superior performance in all three dimensions of ESG. Reaching a high 
overall ESG score is likely to require substantially more investments on CSR than 
reaching a high rating on just one of the dimensions.  
 
Firms with high governance scores are also found to benefit from their superior 
performance but the impact on the cost of debt is smaller in comparison to the high ESG 
score and the high social score. The results of this thesis do not find evidence of 
environmental score having any significant impact on the cost of debt.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that CSR investments can be justified as a way of increasing 
transparency and thus reducing the levels of asymmetrical information. For the most part, 
the findings of this thesis support the conflict resolution theory based on which high levels 
of CSR should lower the interest rate on debt as more information of the firm is available 
for creditors. 
 
However, partial support for overinvestment theory is also found. Interestingly, 
inconsistency is found between the results for high and low social performance as the 
worst social performers seem to gain a similarly lower cost of debt as the best social 
performers. The contradictory results could be due to differences in how creditors value 
social performance and its relation to the creditworthiness of a firm. This observation 
indicates that some creditors regard high social performance an unnecessary cost for the 
firm and thus an overinvestment, whereas other creditors perceive the value of social 
performance as a risk mitigating factor. Similar differences are not found in other 
dimensions which indicates that the importance of high social performance divides 
opinions between creditors more than any other dimension.  
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In conclusion, the results of this thesis suggest that especially listed firms with very high 
CSR performance benefit in the form of a lower cost of debt. The findings have particular 
importance as debt in the form of bank loans and corporate bonds are a significant source 
of external financing for a firm and the size of the debt market surpasses the size of the 
equity market. Furthermore, this thesis uses data collected from the European markets 
whereas previous studies have predominantly examined the matter with data from the 
U.S. markets. Contrary to the U.S., the European firms obtain debt largely from the 
private debt market in the form of bank loans. Due to this difference it is important to 
understand how CSR information is considered by European creditors when pricing debt.  
 
The limitations of this study, such as the reliability of the data, are discussed in the thesis. 
It is unlikely that firms would be able to distort the data as the data are collected from 
several sources and the data reported by the firm, such as annual reports and the websites 
of the firm, is only one of the sources. Moreover, the dataset used is large and includes 
firms from several markets as well as different industries, which decreases the risk of the 
results representing solely a specific industry or firm. 
 
Finally, a few suggestions and ideas for future research emerged during this research. As 
this study concentrated only on the European markets, future research could investigate 
various markets in order to find out whether there are differences between markets in how 
ESG criteria is implemented in loan decisions. Additionally, the data used in this research 
only contained the ESG scores without more information of whether the scores are 
constituted of positive or negative actions or even the lack of CSR actions. Thus, future 
research could take into account both positive CSR actions as well as CSR controversies 
of the firms. Furthermore, due to the dataset containing a limited number of sin stocks, 
only 16 firms, it was not possible to examine sin stocks separately. This presents an 
interesting opportunity for future researchers to study the impact of ESG ratings on the 
cost of debt of sin stocks.  
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics by market and industry. 
 
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
  ESG score Environmental score Social score Governance score Number of firms Mean CoD 
              
Market             
CAC 40 86.07 86.80 87.63 64.67 36 3.86 % 
DAX 30 80.85 85.37 82.89 48.75 26 5.75 % 
FTSE 100 81.88 76.62 78.35 78.53 92 5.69 % 
Nasdaq Copenhagen 56.92 61.51 59.62 43.58 27 5.98 % 
Nasdaq Helsinki 77.72 77.67 72.21 58.72 29 4.87 % 
Nasdaq Stockholm 67.98 71.29 66.52 54.36 60 5.67 % 
Oslo Stock Exchange  59.13 54.60 58.45 56.52 27 6.61 % 
Xetra 56.20 62.23 65.59 31.53 49 7.91 % 
              
Total 70.84 72.01 71.41 54.58 346 5.79 % 
Industry             
Basic Materials 78.11 80.34 79.01 59.62 40 6.31 % 
Consumer Goods 77.91 81.87 79.70 57.54 45 5.77 % 
Consumer Services 75.42 71.67 75.37 62.99 43 6.06 % 
Financials 69.97 68.84 67.48 59.78 62 4.83 % 
Healthcare 67.32 68.66 69.08 50.67 26 5.52 % 
Industrials 69.67 73.66 68.92 54.38 72 6.04 % 
Oil & Gas 62.44 54.90 61.88 64.00 19 6.86 % 
Technology 69.88 64.55 71.57 61.20 17 6.25 % 
Telecommunications 83.60 81.28 81.57 68.17 11 6.53 % 
Utilities 84.18 83.72 86.15 65.29 11 5.22 % 
              
Total 73.85 72.95 74.07 60.36 346 5.94 % 
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Appendix 2. Correlation matrix.  
 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) 
                    
Cost of debt 1.00                 
                    
ESG score -0.10*** 1.00               
                    
Environmental score -0.09*** 0.85*** 1.00             
                    
Social score -0.10*** 0.87*** 0.75*** 1.00           
                    
Governance score -0.09*** 0.67*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 1.00         
                    
Leverage -0.18*** -0.01 -0.02 0.03** -0.01 1.00       
                    
Firm size -0.21*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.40*** 1.00     
                    
Operating profitability 0.16*** 0.02 -0.06*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.20*** -0.22*** 1.00   
                    
Book-to-market -0.03** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.04*** -0.02 0.15*** 0.27*** -0.45*** 1.00 
                    
Levels of significance: * = 0.1, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01               
 
